Exceptionalism, Hegemony and the UNSC Godfathers

Exceptionalism, Hegemony and the UNSC Godfathers

The United Nations secretary general Ban Ki Moon recently announced that the much awaited upcoming report on whether chemical weapons were used in Syria would indeed confirm that they were used. He also stated that President Bashar Al Assad had already committed many crimes against humanity.  He did not go so far as to accuse the Syrian government of the recent 21^st August chemical weapons attack, but the implication of the remark is significant.

A few days ago, the Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, warning the USA to respect the United Nations Security Council as the main authority that decides when, and when not, war can be waged in a non-self defence capacity by any nation. He also implored the USA to guard against inadvertently supporting Al Qaeda militants, who supplement the ranks of the opposition to the Syrian government (even though the extent of their involvement is disputed). He ended by mounting a scathing attack on the notion of “American exceptionalism”, which allows the USA to justify taking unilateral action on global issues of critical importance to planetary security and stability.

Putin made no mention of the deadlock that arrests the UNSC whenever conflict plays out in drastic and brutal measure, and requires an international response. Very rarely, if ever, do the Russians and Chinese see ‘eye to eye’ with the USA on what course of action is necessary or appropriate in these circumstances. Essentially, issues that arise over global and regional security concerns become ‘political footballs’ with which the small pool of key actors in the struggle for global domination play out their struggle to dominate each other. In the quest for power, the focus on what is best for a particular country or region is lost, and instead, a shameful display of chest beating emerges and takes centre stage, as the divisions in the security council play out.

Syria and Syrians - who have endured 100,000 deaths, 4 million internally displaced persons and 2 million refugees who have fled across the border, as well as chemical weapons, open warfare with conventional weapons in the streets of its cities and neighbourhoods, summary executions, torture, suppression of the press, siege and starvation conditions, the suppression of the press, and possibly myriad other crimes against humanity that will be revealed years after the conflict has ended - seem to be on the fringes of the spat that is playing out between China and Russia (and BRICS nations) on the one side, and the USA and France on the other. More recently, the Netherlands has thrown its weight behind the USA-France coalition.

So with Russia casting itself as the protector of the role of the United Nations and the rule of international law, it itself is then bound to act within the framework of the United Nations and international law. Surely this would also imply that if the Syrian government, admittedly a close ally and one of the last footholds of Russia’s regional power in the Middle East, were accused of being guilty of crimes against humanity by the highest authority in the United Nations (Ban Ki Moon), that it is then Russia’s duty to respect, or at the very least entertain the position of the United Nations.

But so far, Russia has refused to acknowledge that the Syrian government has committed war crimes, and has used chemical weapons, and has instead emphasized that its intelligence (i.e. Russia’s) indicates that the opposition is a hotbed of Al-Qaeda jihadists and Islamic extremists, and has accused the opposition of deploying chemical weapons in its own rebel-held territories to manufacture consent for an international intervention. In this, Russia is engaging in duplicitous diplomacy, and is in essence rejecting the UN-held position that the Syrian government is responsible for crimes against humanity. In essence, Russia is adopting a stance which emphasizes its very own sense of ‘exceptionalism’.  All that this reveals, is that Russia is equally prone to the very same hegemonic narrative that proponents of global hegemony adopt, when it suits their interests.

Bashar Al Assad has presided over the greatest human-induced tragedy of the 21^st Century thus far. It does indeed set a precedent for how the international community will handle such events in the future. A key question in this regard is, how far have we come in respect of ensuring that genocides, unjust wars and crimes against humanity are stopped while they are occurring? The biggest lament in respect of these tragedies – i.e. such as Kosovo and Rwanda – is that action is always taken too late, and that great loss of life ensues in the interim period where global power politics takes centre stage instead of the people who are being directly affected. Something is not working in the construction and the role of the UNSC. It is time to admit that and correct it. I would go further, and state that the UNSC needs to be drastically revised in terms of composition and that the right to veto is accompanied by the need to take responsibility and face penalties, in particular; when veto action results in the further facilitation, perpetuation and/or escalation of human tragedy.

In particular, any ‘godfather’ type protection afforded to states that commit crimes against humanity, by an ally in the UN needs to be acknowledged and prosecuted accordingly. It cannot be acceptable that a state can be accused of “crimes against humanity” by the highest authority in the UN, and at the same time receive protection by a UNSC member who goes further to dispute that these crimes are being committed by its ally. If Russia has clear evidence that the Al Assad government is innocent of these crimes then it should – as it required of the USA – make this evidence available to the UN and the UNSC members. Fair is fair, and if Russia argues that its only intention is to uphold international law and protect the role of the UN and UNSC, then it itself must abide by the findings and pronouncements of the UN, even when it disagrees with it.

The Russian attempt to thwart military strikes by the US on Syria has taken the form of a deal to get Syria to give up its chemical weapons for destruction. However, this has very quickly morphed into a protracted negotiations over what the conditions for disarmament would be. Syria now wants to be in charge of destroying its own chemical weapons stockpile. It also wants a guarantee that it will not be attacked by the USA if it gives up its weapons. Pretty soon, we will yet again be trapped in a series of scuppered disarmament processes a-la Saddam Hussein. It is clear that this whole charade is just an attempt to ensure that the imminent attack on Syria is thwarted, and to buy time so that the Syrian government can intensify its attacks on rebel held territories and positions. In all likelihood, the real calculation that is unfolding here, is how much time is required to obliterate and crush the rebels and opposition groups to the Syrian government. The Syrian government is hoping for a distraction, and the disarmament agenda is an ideal decoy. While the world will become locked, entangled and embroiled in negotiations with a government that has already committed numerous crimes against humanity over the course of the civil war thus far, it will continue to intensify its own activities.

On the other hand, the USA – now minus its own exceptionalism – will also ‘win’ its own victory. Obama can rightfully claim that he used the ‘threat of force’ effectively in this situation. If the goal is to rid Al Assad’s government of its chemical weapons, so that the potential of a regional escalation is reduced, then the USA has been very successful indeed. It has managed to get Syria to hand over its weapons without firing a single bullet, let alone a cruise or tomahawk missile. The political spin machines will have no problem turning this into a victory for the new mode of American exceptionalism; Obama’s threat of force and brinkmanship will be hailed as a new, cost effective method of enforcement.  The USA is still the policeman of the world, and Russia has successfully cast itself as a protector of international law and the UN. Everybody wins, except the Syrians that this is all supposed to protect, that is.  

What is clear, from recent events, including the Russian attempt to get Syria to give up and destroy its chemical weapons, is that the UNSC is a symbol of global ‘exceptionalism’ itself. It is a group of godfathers who decide for the world. Their battle for domination in a new world order is what drives global political wrangling over issues that are critical for global security and humanitarianism. It isn’t working for those who are dying, on both sides of the Syrian conflict. As a global community, we need an alternative and a new way of going about solving conflict-driven humanitarian crises that are of global importance. The movement of cold war actors into a ‘cold peace’ of sorts has done little to improve the effectiveness of the UNSC in resolving critical security and humanitarian issues. Instead, we’ve dragged a dysfunctional unit of the past too far with us. It’s time to seriously call into question the whole concept of the UNSC itself, and to decide what reforms, or even complete overhauls are necessary to improve the ability of the international community to act when it is needed to prevent loss of life.

As we enter a new era of global politics and global community and society, some critical thought needs to be given to what serves our interests best as a global community. Sovereignty must be respected, but so must international law and standards. We have the power to decide what kind of world we live in, and how best to handle our differences, as well as conflict driven humanitarian crises. Global institutions need to be constructed in such a manner that they reflect the new era we have entered into, so that they can be more effective in addressing conflict driven humanitarian crises as they occur, and not after they’ve occurred.

Undoubtedly, there will always be skilful actors who attempt to sway decisions one way or another in order to maintain or boost their influence on the global stage, but for the global community to be held hostage in this manner, while another global humanitarian disaster continues un-attended is disgraceful and unacceptable. Whatever ‘success’ stories are spun out as a result of the most recent turn of events in the Syrian war (i.e. giving up its chemical weapons; a big success for both the USA and Russia), the real losers are the Syrian people, and ultimately it is the failure to protect innocent people on both sides of the conflict from further suffering is what the UN and the UNSC will be judged on.

       

The Libya-Syria Intervention Question

It has become reflex to treat remark that foreign interventions in conflict do not work. It is extremely topical to refer to the current situation in Syria using Libya as a lens. The most common remark is that interventions do not work because ‘Libya is in a mess’. The logic is that Libya is in a mess because of the foreign intervention that denied the Gaddafi regime the opportunity to deploy its military in a full-scale attack on the citizens of Benghazi, who had come out onto the streets to express its wish for a change of regime, and the introduction of democracy.

Yes, Libya is in a mess. The state has fragmented, and its oil and gas sector has slumped, exporting only a tenth of what it normally exports. Militias have taken control of oil and gas facilities, and have taken control of local territories, and now openly contest the authority of the state. But is this a result of the foreign-led intervention in Libya, which denied the Gaddafi regime the ability to fight from the air, and provided support to the very same rebel groups who now control respective tribal and other territories?

In order to answer this question, several considerations must be made. Firstly, we have to address the question of what scenarios may have unfolded in Libya in the absence of intervention. Secondly, we have to address the question of whether the intervention itself is the cause of the fragmentation of the Libyan state. We have to address these questions together in order to establish the causality between intervention and state collapse in Libya with sufficient confidence. Failure to do so, is dishonest and misleading.

So let’s deal with the first question, that is; what scenarios may have unfolded in Libya in the absence of intervention. Let’s entertain the possibility that the Gaddafi regime was given the green light to go ahead and crush Benghazi, and route the “vermin” and “al-Qaeda” as Gaddafi repeatedly referred to the opposition. In the event of an all out military attack on Benghazi, only two outcomes can reasonably be envisaged. The first, and most likely, is that Libya would have then become the destination of choice for Jihadi groups from across the world, that the ‘rebels’ would have received piecemeal, basic support from other countries from within and without the region, and the country would have slumped progressively further towards civil war. Indeed, this is how the situation has unfolded in Syria. Hama and Homs were crushed by the Assad regime, and the country has devolved into a civil war within a short period of time. The outcome is 4 million internally displaced people and 2 million refugees who have fled across the borders, and a widespread humanitarian crisis has unfolded that now threatens to destabilize the entire region.

The second, and infinitely less likely outcome is that Benghazi would have been crushed and Libya would have returned to normal under the Gaddafi regime. In this scenario Gaddafi would have continued to strong-arm Libya’s various groups into an artificially cohesive feudal state, and prepared his son, Saif Al Islam, to take over from his rule. In this scenario, Libya continues to sail along as though it is entirely unaffected by the Arab Spring that continues to unfold across the region today. The second scenario is a far less likely outcome, and renders Libya a dictator state, that is; another accident waiting to happen in the region. In this scenario, Libya miraculously out-lives the horror of the crushing of Benghazi and sails off into the future as though it never happened. Hardly likely, actually; extremely unlikely. The stuff crack pipe dreams are made of.

The reasonable scenario, where Gaddafi would have ‘seen the light’ and stepped down and introduced real democratic elections was never on the cards. The proof of this is that he fought until the bitter end. So this, third option was never an option, and anyone who entertains this option has descended far beyond the aforementioned ‘pipe dream’ into the realms of childlike fantasy.

And to return to the original question; in the face of these two outcomes, can we reasonably argue that the fragmentation of the Libyan state is a result of the intervention? Well, nobody can argue with full confidence that they know how history would have unfolded, had particular events been different. That I acknowledge, but it still does not answer the question I originally posed. Is it really true that Libya is worse off because of the foreign intervention that essentially enabled it to break with the shackles of decades of authoritarian rule under a dictator?

In my view, Libya has not fragmented due to the foreign-led intervention. It has fragmented precisely because it has been artificially held together for decades under the violent and brutal rule of a dictator state. It is inevitable that no matter what political transition trajectory it adopted, that it would face a serious challenge in establishing real socio-political cohesion and introducing democratic reforms. It is my contention that wherever dictator-led or authoritarian regimes prevail for long periods of time over territories that are populated by diverse, heterogeneous groups, and rule through powerful centralized states that strong-arm the populace; that the collapse of these regimes inevitably leads the fragmentation of the state. This is simply because the state that people never trusted in the first place, and which held all the power, leaves a profound vacuum in its wake, and ordinary people would reasonably contest the remnants of it, even as it begins to reform. This is especially the case because entrenched interests work hard to hijack the process of democratic reforms to their own advantage. When people see the same state of old re-assembling itself they are quick to recognise the old wolf that now parades in new clothing. They then resist it, and hold onto the gains they have made. These gains are often territorial, especially if these territories have been gained through open, armed conflict in the streets.

That is, intervention or not, the fragmentation of dictator led and authoritarian regimes is inevitable when ‘revolution’ occurs, whether revolution is relatively peaceful (as in Egypt) or involves armed conflict (as in Libya and Syria). This fragmentation is more pronounced in countries such as Libya and Syria, because they are constituted of many, diverse tribal groups and clans. In Egypt, which is not as diverse, the general populace has split nonetheless; both sides (i.e. the anti-Muslim brotherhood and pro-Muslim brotherhood groups) profoundly distrust the state. This is precisely because the powerful centralised state is the main vehicle through which the revolution can be subverted or appropriated, resulting in more of the same ‘wolf’ in new clothing. And so, whether in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq, etc. the same dynamic unfolds when the state is fundamentally challenged by revolution. It (the state) attempts to remake itself amidst the revolution, and this is what all revolutions would do well to guard against, even if it means fragmenting in order to prevent the state from regaining its hold over the people.

The argument I am making here is that when we view these revolutions through another prism (i.e. what the legacy of large, centralised authoritarian or dictator-led states entail for revolution), it becomes patently clear that intervention or not, some fragmentation and commensurate resistance and open contestation with the state is to be expected. Blaming foreign-led interventions for the collapse of the state, ignores the fact that these states were fragile to begin with precisely because their governments and the state were not legitimate or representative in the first place. It ignores the fact that four decades of dictatorship or authoritarian rule would collapse like a ton of bricks no matter which direction the revolution takes.

The difficulty with transitioning to democracy, is precisely that it involves building the strong socio-political foundation that democracy requires. In my view, this is precisely the focus that is missing in the debates on the middle east and north Africa right now. That is, we are not discussing what democratic reforms can help bring about meaningful change and stability; where pluralism is guaranteed, and where the old ‘state’ is prevented from regenerating the very head that the people cut off. But like a lizard, the state can replicate and reproduce itself relatively easily. Indeed, that is what states, like most institutions, do. An institution is an institution precisely because if an individual is removed, it can carry on regardless. It has many heads and many tentacles, which if cut off, can morph and replicate each other. The state survives revolutions, and this is precisely why revolutions are so difficult in the first place; when the people have removed the leadership it is only be beginning of the struggle against the state. Reform - or rather reformation - of the state is at stake, and contestation is inevitable as this process unfolds amidst the unwinding of the previous regime.

The reason why the explanation I have tendered for the fragmentation in Libya is significantly more honest, is that it can be applied across the board in the Arab Spring. By focussing on what kind of state people were rebelling against, and why, it becomes easier to understand why there is such intense distrust of the state, and especially new governments. People who have been subject to the blatant lies and manipulation of an unjust system are quick to recognise when the same factors they fought to remove begin to re-emerge. It does not make sense to lay all the blame for the ‘crisis’ in Libya on the UN-sanctioned intervention. In all likelihood, Libya would have descended into a full scale civil war that resembles Syria without the intervention.

So when it comes to interventions, the question is not whether it will ultimately lead to a complete, binding ‘solution’ to the crisis. Rather, the question that interventions are concerned with is simple; is the intervention going to save lives and prevent the further loss of human life by disabling the capability of a rogue government or state to act illegally and/or brutally. Expecting a foreign led military intervention to automatically lead to full democratic reform, without any bumps in the road, or challenges to the process of transition, is ridiculously naive.

I will use an admittedly crude example by way of analogy, to explain my orientation on the issue of intervention. It is often said that one should not intervene in a domestic dispute, as the risks of both of them turning on you are high. When I was a teenager, one of the men in my apartment block took his wife and children hostage in the apartment, and it was clear that he had lost his ability to reason and may harm them. At the time in South Africa, family killings were occurring at a high rate. A neighbour and devoted father of two little sons – a mild man who I often watched playing soccer with his two boys in the park – convinced the troubled neighbour to open the door claiming that he ‘just wanted to speak with him’. When he opened the door, my brave neighbour pushed the door in and entered the apartment, and managed to get the children and their mother to safety. He put his life at risk to intervene in that situation, especially as the troubled neighbour was armed with a handgun. If the couple divorced after that event, it had nothing to do with the intervention that my brave, mild-mannered, dutiful father and neighbour made, at great risk to himself.

At another time, in the same apartment block, my father helped wrest away a knife from a son who had become enraged and wanted to attack his own father with it. I have also acted in a similar fashion when the need arose. Amongst my friends, the weakest among us would nonetheless stand up for and defend his friends when attacked, even when outnumbered. It was what provided the social bond between us, that is; the ability to take risks to protect one another. This is a very human orientation, which I believe is shared by communities across the world, although admittedly to greater or lesser degrees. But if we are to form and belong to a global community that has norms and standards to which we all subscribe, then we need to be able to take risks for each other when it counts.

The principle for intervention was very simple in the social and political context that I was raised; if someone is being oppressed, is subject to intolerable injustice, and you have the power to help them, then you should make an effort to help them. In the South African struggle the most often heard slogan was, “an injury to one is an injury to all”. Even the Jihadis who migrate half-way across the world also respond to this logic, that is, in the belief that in Islam it is your duty to help people who are being oppressed. Across the world, when human cruelty rises its ugly head and escalates to dangerous proportions, the victims ask, “where was the world when we were being killed”. It’s that simple! If there is no world out there that can intervene to help people in need, then there is no human project, and there is no humanitarianism between us.

Talk, without action, is empty. Sometimes an intervention requires political action, at other times actions to provide aid and humanitarian relief, and in the worst of situations, to intervene militarily in an escalating conflict or gross human rights abuses. Indeed, the United Nations is based upon these principles, and should take the lead in producing global consensus on how to address human disasters, whether they are due to social, economic, political and environmental changes, or whether they result from conflict or result in conflict. But what if the UN cannot provide an adequate response to a humanitarian disaster because it is crippled by political wrangling, total absence, or alternatively - if not equally - by bureaucratic ineptitude?

In a free society, I, as a citizen have the right to act to stop a crime if the law isn’t present, or is incapable of acting. If a policeman is incapacitated I am still legally entitled to effect a citizen’s arrest if I observe and judge that a criminal act is unfolding before me. This, at the same time, binds me to the responsibility, that after acting, I should make myself available to be judged by my actions in terms of the law. As long as I act reasonably, and in the interests of the social contract, I should be confident that I will be judged fairly. That is, even if I am not acting in self-defence, the law should always make provision for acting in the interests of greater society. Why should it be different for global citizens?

When it comes to Libya, the broadly proffered notion that Libya is in crisis because of the intervention it underwent is spurious and misleading. It negates all attempts at establishing adequate causality, and chooses instead to ignore Libya’s historical dispensation, and the consequences of any fundamental challenges that the Libyan state (and other authoritarian states) may endure. It is (and should be) obvious, that the authoritarian, often dictator-led states and governments of the Middle East and North Africa have endured the challenges to their rule by responding with increased levels of instability and fragmentation. This is what fundamental change and revolution brings; periods of enhanced turbulence where periodic internal conflicts, state confrontations and disruptions of all manners - both positive and negative - flare up from their respective potentials in the aftermath of revolution.

Democratic reform is not just about holding elections, writing constitutions, and changing legal systems; it is fundamentally about changing the state - that is; it’s functions, processes, regulations and authorities, and thereby its institutions - so that a new society can be produced. Producing a new society, especially in a society where socio-political cohesion has been artificially enforced by state institutions and the rule of authoritarian and/or dictatorial regimes, is bound to prove a challenge beset by many and diverse setbacks. In any quest for a new society, struggle is inevitable. It cannot avoided.

Whatever help a society receives from outsiders in obtaining the freedoms it requires to negotiate its own transition to a new set of norms and practises is only just that, help. Ultimately, what transpires in such fraught socio-cultural, political and economic countries depends on how well they can organise, as a society, to face their challenges. If they are unable to do so, it is only a reflection of how devastated societies in these countries are as a result of the long terms under which they have endured unjust governments. Placing the blame for the failures of these nations to re-establish themselves adequately in a post-revolutionary environment at the feet of interventionists ignores the political history of these nations entirely, and seeks to establish the moment of intervention as the beginning of the causal chain of events that lead to the failure of the state. This is a patent analytical falsehood. The reality is that these states had already failed to meet the demands and aspirations of their citizenry. They had already crumbled from within and were disasters waiting to happen. Intervention may be the last straw that breaks the camel’s back, but it is dishonest to ignore the oversized load that countries such as Libya and Syria were already carrying, which led to this mess in the first place.

Equating Libya with Iraq is even more ridiculous; these were entirely different situations. To start with, the intervention in Libya was supported by the UN. Interventions in sovereign states is a necessity in a globalized world. We cannot avoid the responsibility of acting to enforce global laws, else they become meaningless. When laws become meaningless, societies become corrupted, and all manner of abuses ensue. It makes the world more dangerous for all of us. It is this objective that interventions are concerned with, and not rescuing entire nations from the difficulties of political transitions that they must now negotiate because of their fraught histories. To campaign against any and all interventions on the basis that global hegemony is undesirable, or that only peaceful means will be effective, ignores everything that we know about genocide.

There will always be rulers and leaders who justify the use of unconscionable levels of force against their people. It does not always require chemical or nuclear weapons. In Rwanda, 500,000 machetes were enough to fuel genocide in which around 800,000 people lost their lives. The Syrian conflict reflects an abject failure of its own government. With 100,000 people dead, 4 million internally displaced and 2 million refugees across the border, and no end in sight to the conflict, it is clear that there will be no political solution that will emerge from within Syria. In all likelihood, without international involvement, Al Assad’s forces will crush both the opposition and all internal dissent that may emerge from within the country itself. The solution in Syria will not be political, it will be a military one, should Syria be left to its own devices. The anti-intervention stance, in this case, does not mean that any kind of peace will result. The implications of not intervening now is that the situation worsens, eventually drawing the entire region into its spectacular collapse. And as more information becomes available, and dribbles out of the Syrian state over the next few years, an intervention will likely become necessary in any event. As was the case in Kosovo, the world will avert its eyes just long enough for the brutality to result in another genocide, which after it is committed, cannot be undone. And then, all the wringing of hands in the world makes no difference to the families of the dead, should any of them remain. It will, and should, rest upon our consciences if we stood by and did nothing to prevent it, with all the evidence being clear that only more suffering can result from the path Syria is currently on.

The Occupy Protests: Being Leaderless Helps Reshape The Territory

Perhaps the most striking characteristics of the protests that have emerged over the past year and half, whether they have originated from the Arab Spring in the middle east, or in the cities of the developed world, is that they are mostly leaderless, and that their various manifestations have proven to be devoid of a single governing ideology. Instead, they have become forums for participation, where a wide variety of views and ideological orientations can find a voice. As one OWS protester put it, it is not so much an ideological movement as much as it is a space for participation.

In the Arab Spring, a necessary debate has emerged around how to reconcile Islamic governance with democratic principles, and the elections in Tunisia reflect this. There is also an emerging debate on the role of women in Islamic democracy. These are both welcome developments that attest to the power that the Arab Spring has brought to the general discourse on politics and political freedom in the middle east, and the role of society and leaders within it. Islamic extremism has been put under the microscope and questions that were once thought unthinkable have now entered the mainstream. It's not perfect, but it's a beginning.

In developed countries where 'mature' democracies have been in place for the better part of the last forty years, the occupy and anti-austerity protest movements have also re-opened the space for debate around the fundamentals of democracy. In the last 20 years, 'talk left, walk right' political strategies have emerged in the wake of the weakening of the left through the era of neoliberal 'free' market economics. At the same time, conservative ultra-right movements such as the 'tea-party' increasingly appropriate the language of the old left. In short, developed countries have become plagued by bipolar democracies where it has become increasingly meaningless whether a democrat/labour or republican/conservative government is voted into power, because they ultimately end up thinking and acting in the same way.

Whether one chooses right or left, is an increasingly meaningless exercise in this muddled new territory of democracy, and it is obvious that the public responded with a profound apathy during the boom times. Now that the bubbles have burst, their voices are being raised. Those who were once content to sit in the middle and watch either side throw barbs at each other have entered the fray. They are not explicitly ideological, but they all want change. They may not all have the same ideas of how to make changes, but they know what needs changing. Simply put, it is unfairness at work in the heart of democracy. It is the violation of the egalitarian principle that lies at the heart of democracy itself. Inequality has always had strong appeal as a mobilising factor for those on the lower rungs of the divide, and when their ranks grow they become dangerous. It's as simple as that. And it's not perfect, but it is a beginning.  

It is a beginning because these leaderless mass movements have opened up the space for participation, and participation is the first step towards greater dialogue and exchange that can shape a new discourse. The 'leaderlessness' of these movements is precisely what makes them a potent force for change. That is, they are not already wrapped up in ideological clothing that predetermines how the debates and conversations may unfold. Instead, their leaderlessness and lack of monolithic ideological posturing means that the opportunity now exists to host a social dialogue on what core principles are needed to navigate the territory of the new century, and what kind of changes might be necessary to realise these principles.  

Perhaps the most significant demonstration that the protesters have given the world, is that it is still possible to engage governments and institutions through direct protest action. Some may underestimate this, but for the past twenty years there has been a significant public reluctance to engage in direct protest action. This critically important regulating function of democracy gave way to a global wave of apathy, especially in the countries of the developed world. The triumphal march of a victorious capitalism brought with it a sense that capitalism itself was timeless, and the reigns that had previously kept markets in check were loosened, as markets themselves were seen as the 'self-regulating' magic-makers of prosperity. The results of this victory are now plain to see, and the hopes that things would 'self-correct' after the collapse are proving more distant than ever before.

We are now entering an era where new norms will be established. Business as usual may find a few more tricks and turns to keep itself alive, but the foundations of business as usual have been shaken. The longer the recession persists, the more it becomes a rallying cry to the middle and working classes who have been displaced from real power in the oligarchical functions of the neoliberal dream where there are 'one set of rules for us, and another set of rules for them'. The longer they remain leaderless in their protests, and refuse to be coopted into simplistic sets of agreements that hijack their momentum, the momentum will grow, ideas will flourish, and a new discourse and new normative orientations will be birthed.

Perhaps we are at a moment of the same significance as the modernists of the 20th century found themselves at, filled with the promise of a brave new world, yet unsure of exactly what it may end up looking like. Let's hope that this time we are able to avoid falling into the trap of conflict, and that our enhanced ability to share ideas, conduct campaigns and achieve genuine political action in different places of the world can help us overcome the very real challenges we face. Should these leaderless protests become captured by populists who skillfully capture the 'vacuum' instead of celebrating the potential of the 'vacuum', then the risk of fragmentation and conflict will become more significant and perhaps overwhelm the momentum that, although currently loosely bound, may yet still yield a new set of ideas, visions and norms that effect change in ways that are as yet unforeseeable.

Again, true freedom is the ability to bring about fundamental change, so we might regard the 'leaderless vacuum' as a free space in which the birth of the new is possible. Straight-jacketing this space into a re-run of old positions and ideologies will prove to be its undoing. A parody of the ideological conflicts of the 20th century is hardly likely to achieve anything more than it has already, and in truth, these positions have already compromised themselves to each other, and to their own foundations, and have drifted far away from their original foundations.

And we do need the new to flourish, now more than ever. The Euro hangs on a thread, the dollar would be a worthless currency without China's strong backing. The 'free' market has failed because the most predictable of human behaviours, greed and the propensity to desire wealth without work, triumphed over the imaginary virtues of self-interest. We are now in trouble, and we have to work together to dig ourselves out of the mess we're in. An old supervisor, who oversaw me through probably the most difficult career transition I've ever attempted once gave me some advice that has seen me through many do it?" from me, he replied, "I find that the most difficult thing is keeping the space open long enough for something to emerge".

In research, as in life, you often have no idea what you are going to discover or develop when a project begins, all you have is a bunch of ideas and speculations about how to move forward. Yet if you keep the space open long enough, and stay faithful to the spirit of the project, something always emerges that makes it worth the wait. Perhaps the same kind of philosophical openness is required now, and hopefully we will find the strength to move into the unknown so that we can discover something better than what we have now, because more of the same isn't going to make the cut, and is more likely to sink the ship than to keep it afloat. Tossing the blame from one side to the next isn't going to solve anything, and we have to face up to the deep flaws that exist on both sides of the political divide, and soon.     

Libyan Rebels On a Killing Spree

When Muammar Gaddafi was dragged out from his hiding place, it was perhaps expected that the rebel group who had captured him would flaunt his capture as a trophy moment. Parading him for their camera's, his pleas for mercy were far removed from the rambling and disconnected speeches he gave on television and radio, where he referred to the rebels as "rats" and "vermin", who were acting under the influence of drugs - that they were either taking by choice, or that they had been duped into taking while drinking laced coffee etc. At the same time he had accused them of being Al Qaeda infiltrators, Islamic militants bent on destroying Libyan unity, and promised to hunt down the rebels from "house to house" using the phrase "zenga-zenga" which was later made into a song. As he quoted from his green book, he reasserted that he was not the leader of Libya, and that the leadership was in the hands of the people - he had given power to the people long ago, in 1972. It was a grand example of the doublespeak that propagandists of all kinds utilise to retain power, "the power is with you, I am just your vessel". In this brand of monarchy, the 'divine right' to rule is granted by the people - but the people don't vote on it, so the irony is difficult to avoid. It creates the preconditions for two realities to co-exist at the same time; a spoken reality, and an unspoken reality.

Despite the noble, self-aggrandizing shows of 'people power', in reality, Libya was still under his vice, however, and his hold on power was undoubtable. His sons Khamis and Moutassim controlled two feared army brigades of their own, which were far better equipped and trained than the regular army. Moreover, his son Saif El Islam Gaddafi, who bears a PhD from the London School of Economics (that was retracted when the Libyan uprising began, and followed by high profile resignations at the school when it as revealed that they had accepted large sums of Libyan funding to set up an african student exchange programme) was the designated heir to the Gaddafi throne. Saif El Islam Gaddafi was widely touted as a reformist, an art lover and patron, and cut the profile of a Saudi prince of sorts, well-heeled, moneyed and benevolent. Yet when the appeals for elections and democracy arose, and the rebels began to fight the Libyan army in the streets, Saif stood by his father, repeated the claims that the rebels were drug addled Islamic militants who disguised their true ambitions under the appeal for democracy. It was the turning point at which Saif could have changed the course of history and assumed a leadership role in the peaceful transition of Libya to a democracy. Yet it must be emphasized, that he refused to play any such role. That much is visible to anybody who cares to watch the interviews he granted to journalists in Tripoli. It was strange, if not disturbing, to see the unelected, unappointed son of the Brother Leader fielding questions from the press instead of the formal government. Very quickly the formal government of Gaddafi's Libya began to unravel, with high profile defections almost daily, followed by defections from the general army and special forces. The defections included people who had worked alongside Gaddafi for decades, and people who had been with him during the bloodless coup that brought him to power. The defected appeared on television in press interviews, revealing their detailed explanations for defection, and repeated their calls for their former leader to stand down and to allow the transition to democracy to unfold.

Many have written rather romantically about Gaddafi's role on the African continent - that he financed large developmental projects and efforts to improve the plight of Africa as a whole, championing the formation of a "United States of Africa". He supported the ANC in their struggle against Apartheid and almost singlehandedly funded the raising of the first African telecommunications satellite. Further away he supported the IRA in Ireland, Charles Taylor in Liberia and FARC in Columbia. To many on the left, he was a quirky but unshakeable symbol of rebellion against the west, the loyal brother leader who was unafraid to openly take on the forces of global hegemony. Citing the high standards of living and state funded support and opportunities available to Libyans, Gaddafi is presented as a latter day Che Guevara, who stood with the downtrodden people of the Global South against the exploitative powers in the west and created a country that provides of exceptional social services to its people. Yet with this adulation, the more unsavoury factors of his rule go unacknowledged - including mass executions of political prisoners, the exploitation of Libya's oil resources for personal gain, and the creation of a state security apparatus and government media machine that only Stalin could be proud of.

Instead, the left wax lyrical about the 'criminalisation' of the Libyan government that has been conducted by the mainstream global press. This, despite the fact that Gaddafi found no support amongst his Arab neighbours, and that the Libyan press was a state organ. Moreover, despite South Africa's attempts to employ the same 'quiet diplomacy' tactic that clearly failed in Zimbabwe - and voicing support for Gaddafi - they nonetheless voted in favour of imposing a no-fly zone in Libya at the UN. If Gaddafi posed no real threat to Libyans at that stage, then why didn't South Africa vote against the no fly zone? Likewise, why didn't Russia veto it? Their messages of solidarity don't match their actions - their actions show that they did fear that Gaddafi would conduct a violent purge of the Libyan people. The only other real support Gaddafi has obtained has been from Hugo Chavez, who himself has embarked upon the road to dictatorship by seeking to change the Venezuelan constitution to allow him to stay in power (and Nicaragua, who has received large financial support from Gaddafi). It is a duplicitous game that South Africa and indeed many other African states have played in this affair, attempting to hedge their bets both ways to guarantee the flow of Libyan cash to their countries (and perhaps, it must be stated bluntly, even to their personal bank accounts).

The left have detailed how a global conspiracy against Gaddafi has been engineered by the press to "criminalise" him and his government, yet it was not second-hand accounts of Gaddafi that we received. He was given more airtime on news channels for his speeches and interviews than any other global leader, more than Obama could ever hope for, even if he managed to win the next election and surprise everyone again. His press representative also had a clear and open line to the press and repeated claims to legitimacy, and of foreign interference in Libya without any interruption. If the threats Gaddafi and his son made, live on tv, were not real, then the international media have engineered the most spectacular media manipulation we have ever experienced. It was clear, from the words of Gaddafi, and his son Saif, that they were preparing for a fight to the death. That much cannot be denied by anybody. They saw themselves as having an undeniable right to leadership in Libya, and that much can be understood directly from the words that emerged from their very own mouths. They were also convinced of their support base, and were prepared to go the route of warfare. It is not just the rebels who were willing to go down the path of warfare and destruction to achieve their ends. The Gaddafi camp were also bent on retaining power at all costs. To be fair to the National Transitional Council, they were keen to negotiate with Gaddafi and to find a compromise that would see him leave with dignity (this was repeated by many defectors in the media), yet their calls for Gaddafi to step down were met with an unflinching obstinance. Nobody was going to dictate anything to him - he was the only one who had the right to dictate!

Not unlike Robert Mugabe, the beleaguered president of Zimbabwe who refused to vacate his post when he lost the elections, Gaddafi was undoubtedly a dictator. If he is not, then the term will scarcely find application to anyone else in the world. When a country's main decisions and power bases are in the hands of one man and his sons, either he is a king or a dictator. Yet for those who look only to his external actions and his larger than life role in Africa (dubbing himself the King of Kings in Africa), tend to ignore the fact that Libya was an oil rich country - oil is what enabled Gaddafi to play an especially magnanimous role as a funder of revolutionary groups elsewhere, while still providing the Libyan people with a relatively high standard of living, basic services and education in Africa. His friends included many African dictators who robbed their countries blind and rendered them dysfunctional. He was the mr moneybags in Africa, and he enjoyed his largess and his self-appointed role as the king of Africa. Meanwhile, at home, Libyans were not free. No matter what the statistics on basic services and government support for Libyans shows on paper, Libyans did not possess the freedom to determine their future, or to exercise control over their resources. In this, Gaddafi was not unlike other oil rich monarchs in the region, who also have relatively high standards of living, education and basic services provision in their countries. Freedom, however, is not the freedom to eat, work, learn, obtain healthcare and the like. That is, freedom cannot be bought or paid for. When someone buys your freedom you are still a slave, you have just transferred ownership. Freedom is the freedom to act in concert with others to change what needs changing in a political system, without fear of recrimination or exile.

Yet it is difficult for anyone with a genuine claim to compassion, however, not to feel pity towards the deposed Gaddafi, begging for his life amongst the former 'rats', now appealing to them, begging for his life, "you are my sons". Very quickly it became clear that Gaddafi was executed by the rebels. It seemed the rebels had no regard for his human rights, or his rights as a prisoner of war. Having torn up pictures, posters and effigies of Gaddafi for many months, his capture seems to have led to a similar frenzy ... as mobile phone footage of his lynching seems to indicate. He was paraded about briefly, beaten upon, humiliated and somewhere along the way he was shot. Footage has also recently emerged, of a man claiming to be the one who executed him, celebrating his role in history amongst other rebels as water is poured over his head. It will take some investigation to uncover the actual sequence of events, as many will make claim to the greatest 'trophy' in the war.

Gaddafi's son, Moutassim, who commanded a feared brigade and was responsible for his fathers security, was also captured. A video of him smoking a cigarette and swigging from a bottle of water has been posted on the internet. He also seems to have been executed by the rebels, even though they have claimed that his injuries led to his death. Khamis Gaddafi is also dead, and Saif El Islam Gaddafi has managed to escape the clutches of the rebels once again. His whereabouts still remain unknown. The Gaddafi family has been hounded out of power, their lives have been taken, and those who remain of his family have left the country to seek exile in Algeria.

Indeed, when people have been brutalised the potential to respond in kind is always great. If one takes even a cursory glance at other revolutions in central and southern Africa, it is undeniable that when the violence eventually breaks, it breaks like a Tsunami, consuming everyone and everything in its path. This should not surprise us. Neither should we be quick to relegate the rebels to the classification of 'thugs' or 'animals'. Even when the violence broke in colonised African countries, the colonisers were quick to dismiss rebellion under the same terms. They were loathe to accept their own role in creating the 'savage monsters' that rose up against them - i.e. through centuries of slavery, violence, abuse and dehumanisation - in very much the same way the Gaddafi regime has refused to accept any criticism of the Libyan government in any measure. It was a big mistake to execute Gaddafi and his son, as seems to be the case. Executing them rendered them outside of the realm of the law. They do not have to answer for their actions and decisions, and they escape the judgement of society as they cannot defend themselves. Instead, it allows for them to be hailed as martyrs who 'fought to the end'. It has made the task of the rebels more difficult as their absence in death may loom larger than their presence in life would have in a court of law, where they could be put to trial and forced to answer for their crimes.

Yet the killing, it appears, did not stop there. Human rights watch has announced that the bodies of 53 Gaddafi loyalists were found, with their hands bound behind, them having been shot in the head. The rebels have themselves begun to look very much the same as the Gaddafi loyalists, who also left scores of executed prisoners in their wake as they fled Tripoli. They have failed to uphold a moral highground, and have failed to guarantee the human rights they claim to be fighting for, to their opponents. This is not a trivial development, as the real test of one's belief in human rights is the ability to extend those rights to one's enemy. The post-Gaddafi Libya, now awash with weapons and ammunition, and rebels who have come to know battle and murder is a precariously balanced situation that might disintegrate yet even further into violence. As the Egyptian revolution has shown, the myriad interests and conflicts that emerge in the post-dictatorship power struggle can prove to be the undoing of the original aims of the revolution itself.  

It was the Gaddafi regime who originally characterised the rebels as less than human, unworthy of negotiating with on any matters, and they maintained this view despite the fact that the Libyan government was defecting more and more rapidly to the rebel's side. However, the rebels have now shown themselves to be equally brutal, and have transgressed the basic conditions upon which human rights are founded. Extra-judicial executions, conducted by rebel groups, can only lead to further a further descent into hell for the people of Libya. If what follows the revolution is a bullet fueled purge of any and all opposition to the rebels, then the old Libyan government and the new Libyan government will in effect be the same. Revolutionary movements, whether led or fragmented, often come to mirror those they fight against. It is their responsibility to break the pattern and establish a new history. Otherwise, they offer no improvement on what existed before them, and the sacrifices that were made to obtain freedom would have been made in vain. Their cause will not be recognised as just unless their actions are equally just, and nobody should overlook the executions and massacres that are being perpetrated by the rebels in their campaign. Freedom cannot be established through executing ones enemies. It begins when one forgives ones enemies and embraces them. Only then can the past be reconciled and a new future emerge. Should the killing continue in Libya, it will be torn apart, and Gaddafi would in the end be proved correct, that Libyans needed a dictator such as himself to hold them together. 

With Gaddafi Dead, Libya's Biggest Challenges Begin

The death of Muammar Gaddafi has been announced by both sides, and footage of his dead body, at first hunched over headfirst into the street, then turned over with what seemed to be the help of a foot and sprawled out on the street for a head-shot, his hands still tangled up in the sleeves of his shirt above his head. An awful end, as awful as many have had in defence against his repression, and in defence of his regime. It was perhaps a fitting death that resonated with the tragedy of his character - in the end, delusional and self-aggrandizing in equal measure, able only to see his heroic reflection mirrored back at him through the eyes of himself and others. The martyr's death he sought out did not find him. A martyr is only a martyr in the eyes of others, not in his own eyes.

Yet the finality that accompanies the death of a dictator, or the removal of a dictator, is often misleading. The euphoria of freedom, while well deserved in most cases, having followed a difficult struggle to attain it, can create the conditions for the smooth talkers to enter the fray and hijack the newfound freedom, while it is still virginal, untouched and untested. In the desperation to make a show of stability and solidarity to the outside world, many compromises may be made without thinking through the long term consequences sufficiently. This is not to suggest that compromises won't be necessary. Undoubtedly, compromise will play a key role in establishing the bonds and trust that is necessary to forge unity. However, instead of speeding up the transition, now is the time to slow it down. In the rush towards a new dispensation, there is a good chance that Libya might establish agreements (especially over it's oil and natural gas) that may seem worthwhile in the short term (primarily to get funds into the new government), but may in the long term lead to the self-replication of the very same structures and power relationships that enabled their oppression in the first place.

This is the time for Libya to slow down the technocrats who will undoubtedly invade their newly freed country, promising to rebuild infrastructures and ensure prosperity and global competitiveness. Their primary goals will be to get the flow of oil and gas pumping again, and to ensure their share of it for the needs of their respective markets or countries. They will remind Libyans of how the western world views them, and distrusts their commitment to 'global principles', in much the same way as the new dispensation in South Africa was coaxed to privatise and deregulate the South African economy just two years into the new democracy (in 1996). Above all, Libyans will have to recognise that building a new democratic dispensation is not a technical exercise. It is a profoundly socio-cultural and political exercise. Democratic countries can often give the appearance of stability and wealth generation, yet the fundamental values upon which democracy is constructed can be absent. These are empty vessels, where democratic rhetoric prevails while the institutions, power relations and political structures remain the same, or worsen, deepening inequality, corruption and poverty. Putting the technical needs of a democracy first - i.e. rebuilding infrastructures, stimulating consumption, and so forth - while understandable, has been the undoing of many newly founded democracies.

What Libyans should be acutely conscious of, is how adopting policies, positions and trade, regulatory and governance frameworks that may at first seem desirable, may in the end lead to the formation or re-establishment of the very same structures that prevailed in the past, or new forms of the same exploitative hierarchies, structures and processes of governance i.e. the same old wolves disguised in the new sheepskin gear of democratic progress. The sly opportunists will also make their voices heard, now that the danger of death is no longer imminent, and they may even exploit pre-existing divisions to achieve their ends. Now is the time for vigilance in Libya - I must add, a calm vigilance that slows down the pace of change enough for engagement of all the peoples and communities of Libya to be achieved, in formulating their new constitutionality and form of government. Democracy is by no means a faithful partner, it requires rethinking, contemplating, consulting widely and acting with care. At worst, democracy yields a mirage of freedom - an appearance of freedom may prevail, yet it will remain beyond one's grasp.

The Transitional National Council will face difficult challenges now that they will be called upon to ensure that the functions and services of the state is restored, and that society can begin to live again. It is appropriate to celebrate the newfound freedom that Libyans have achieved through half a year of desperate fighting. That is undoubtedly deserved. But Libyans should beware the rush to establish 'normality'. New norms need to be established for democracy to thrive. These are not universal, and should be determined from engagement with citizens from every community, district, town and city in Libya. The Libyan constitution should be drafted by the people of Libya, and not a select group of appointed representatives who specialise in writing new constitutions for virginal democracies. If it is formulated in this way it will not reflect the will of the Libyan people as expressed by themselves. It will be a second-hand constitutionality that runs the risk of being equally foreign to Libyans as the very same regime they fought against.

There will be heavy international pressure to turn the Libyan revolution into a success as quickly as possible so that nations who backed the Libyan rebels can find justification for their decision to intervene. The timing is good, as by comparison the Egyptian revolution seems to be faltering under heavy military rule, and the Syrian and Bahraini peaceful uprisings have been brutally repressed by their regimes, who are still in place. Libya will be touted as an 'example' of how regime change can be effected through intervention. In short, where George Bush Jr failed  through war in the Middle East, Barack Obama will be eager to show success. There is a danger in this, as eagerness to achieve 'success' often results in the show of success rather than substantive, real results. Moreover, the scars of war and conflict will take longer to heal than might at first be appreciated. Re-building society in the aftermath of war requires more than just re-establishing basic services. It requires rebuilding communities that may be deeply affected by the war. It requires reconciling the conflicts and feuds that may remain, even after freedom has been achieved. It also requires broad participation in envisioning what kind of country Libya should be in the future. Failure to approach the future through wary eyes may result in a Libya that Libyans are still not free in, and in which their freedoms are guaranteed on paper, but not in practice. Slowing down, and taking each step carefully, will go further towards ensuring a lasting democracy in Libya.

Rebels Reach Tripoli & Encounter a Mongol Retreat

The Libyan drama reached new heights on Sunday night when rebels poured into the capital city, Tripoli, where Muammar Gaddafi and his close supporters have held out since the beginning of the conflict. It almost seemed as though the rebels had entered a vacuum, as pro-Gaddafi troops and supporters retreated into the neighbourhoods and districts of Tripoli where they could dig in and maintain their resistance to the sweeping changes that have gripped the country since early this year. 

For six months since the revolt in Benghazi, battles have raged across the landscape in a back and forth series of retreat and attack performed by both pro-Gaddafi troops and the rebels alike. The attack on Tripoli, which came from all sides, including the sea, took pro-Gaddafi supporters by surprise - but it stands to reason that pro-Gaddafi forces would have anticipated an attack on Tripoli commencing at some stage, and would have made plans to receive such an attack.

At first, this retreat, absorb and attack strategy seemed to be the core strategy of the pro-Gaddafi camp. Like many militaries, using the mongol retreat strategy makes sense in two ways. Firstly, it damages the psychology of over-eager combatants who confuse the retreat with surrender and are taken by surprise when the mongols would, after days of retreating, turn around and attack. Secondly, where the enemy is severely resource limited, they expend a lot of resources in the chase and extending the series of attacks and retreats is guaranteed to wear down their available resources. This strategy made sense at the outset, when weapons and fuel shortages amongst the rebels was in question, and their untrained, young, rag-tag groups showed a great deal of inexperience in the field.

Yet over the past six months, the rebels have been financed, trained, equipped and supported by NATO-led forces in their campaign to reach Tripoli. They have advanced, retreated and re-advanced upon the cities that line the route to Tripoli, and have finally reached the city. Yet the absence of any resistance as they entered the city may be a consequence of two factors - firstly that they took the city by surprise, and secondly that pro-Gaddafi forces inside Tripoli may well have gambled upon a back-up plan that would meet the inevitable rebel advance into the city with a plan to absorb them into the city, frustrate them through urban warfare on unfamiliar territory and eventually surprise them somehow through a hidden attack. Gaddafi's son Khamis, who commands feared ultra-loyal Gaddafi troops, may be the one upon whom these hopes are resting. 

After claims that two of Gaddafi's sons had been captured on Sunday, it now seems that Saif El Islam was not captured in the first place, and Gaddafi's other supposedly captured son - Mahomed - has 'escaped'. Saif El Islam made a showing to the press, who are located in the Rixos hotel (a hotel that is very near the Gaddafi compound), surrounded by small groups of supporters who cheered him on, giving the impression that he was freely operating within the city. However, it is clear, that his freedom is now restricted to the areas in which his family still enjoys support, and it would have been relatively easy for him to make an appearance at the Rixos hotel in which the press is located. Indeed, it is convenient that the international press were located so close to the Gaddafi compound, as it complicates efforts to attack the compound without restraint. A misfire here or there could result in the deaths of journalists, which would draw international condemnation for whoever misfires in their direction. Moreover, even after the Libyan state television station has been captured by rebels, Gaddafi's son's can still enjoy access to the international press, and spread misinformation and create confusion over the unfolding saga to their ultimate advantage. They have the dual benefit of a human shield, and access to the international press.

It seems unlikely, however, that the pro-Gaddafi strategy is to win against the rebels. Instead, it seems that their strategy is to drag out the conflict for as long as possible, so that it becomes either unbearable or slows into a stalemate. Already, pro-Gaddafi fighters have been reported to be using heavy artillery againt the rebels. Their objective is not a 'victory for the people' as their rhetoric espouses. Rather, their goal is totalitarianism at all costs. It does not matter whether Libya splits into two, or into myriad tribal factions, their goal is to hold their ground because they have nowhere else to go.

There is also the mythology of Gaddafi to draw on, that is; as the mythological defeator of the West, and unifier of Africa - an anti-crusader who has the mettle to take on the hegemonic rulers of the world who have trampled upon the rights of the poor and ex-colonised. The symbolism of Gaddafi is not just an act - it is clear that it is a deluded reality for Gaddafi himself, in addition to his sons and supporters. This in itself is nothing new. There are many leaders in history who have made grotesque decisions because they have a sense that they are 'annointed' by God and the people for a special purpose, including George Bush, who went to war on Iraq with fabricated or unreliable evidence to end the rule of another one of the annointed, Saddam Hussein. At the heart of these mythologies lies the lack of the ability to be accountable for one's actions. This is not unique to Gaddafi or his sons alone, no matter how much their actions and views may be despised and it is true that this mythology prevails today even amongst those who would not voice their support for Gaddafi.

Obfuscation, and not military might, is behind the real strategy of the pro-Gaddafi supporters that are still remaining. The less we are able to tell exactly what is going on in Libya (and Tripoli in particular) the more room there is to contest the victories that are proclaimed by the rebels. The press are unable to make clear judgements on what is transpiring, and amongst the confusion, it is easy for the pro-Gaddafi camp to claim that the nature of the conflict can be boiled down to their word against others. Indeed, Gaddafi and his cronies have laid down the template for other dictators worldwide who may be facing popular resistance, and they have taken heed. The Syrian regime has been allowed to sustain a low-level war against 'rebel' neighbourhoods and towns, and have employed the very same rhetoric as the pro-Gaddafi supporters have. What is emerging, is a handbook for the remaining dictator regimes on the planet - how to use the press and multi-media to maintain confusion and mixed messages long enough to survive popular uprisings. In this sense, the battle for Libya is not just about Libya alone (even though it should be). It has global implications, and the aged dictators of the world are paying close attention. The mongol retreat seems to have consistently been the key strategy of the pro-Gaddafi forces, and they haven't abandoned the hope that their suicidal strategy will ultimately yield a victory. They are hoping that making enough smoke might just convince their opponents and the world that they have enough firepower to see this through to a victorious end.

In the end, it is difficult to concieve of a scenario where the rebel, pro-democracy forces give up and go home. It would mean that the state apparatus would be unleashed on them and their families in retribution for their disobedience. Many would die, and many would have to flee. This is indeed an endgame, and while it may drag on for some time - in the same way the whole conflict has - it is an  endgame for both sides. There has to be a winner and a loser, and if Gaddafi wins the message that will go out to the Arab Spring and the rest of the world is that 'might is right', and that ultimately we live in a world where power cannot be challenged or overcome on humanitarian grounds. That, is what the ultimate message will be if the rebels fail to win. The consequences of this will be the same kind of resistance we have seen emerge amongst the palestinians - where suicidal guerilla attacks becomes the avenue for asserting the power of the powerless and the conflict enters into an infinite well of deceit and misrepresentation out of which there is no way out.

Gaddafi forces have been defeated throughout the country, and his regime has suffered mass defections amongst the leadership and his armed forces over the past six months. It is highly unlikely that the 'rebels' would simply give up and allow themselves and their families to be slaughtered for their efforts in turn. For all the talk of NATO support, the reality is that the rebels have endured high losses in human lives and have fought the ground war they asked for with great difficulty. They are not professional soldiers, and have had to learn how to do battle with far superior forces within a timespan of six months. Their growth in numbers has only increased as the battles have intensified, and despite their heavy losses they seem united in one goal - to get rid of the Gaddafi regime - even though there may not be much clarity on what comes afterwards. Every bit of energy seems to be going into winning victory first - perhaps this is understandible, as if any semblance of the regime remains in place there will be no real democracy to speak of in Libya. 

      

    

Al Qaeda in Libya - Overblown Propaganda

It is to be expected that existing Al Qaeda recruits within Libya would join the struggle against the regime. It is also conceivable that Hezbollah would have sent support to Libya during the long period of deliberation that the UN undertook in reaching its decision to follow through on resolution 1973. Yet, to paint this as an Al Qaeda, extremist led uprising is a load of hogwash. And there is a very good way to test the assertion that Al Qaeda will capture the vacuum of power that might result when Gaddafi departs, resulting in a similar turnabout as was experienced in Afghanistan.

And this is the view that the Russian government, the opposite and equal partner in the cold war is now espousing. And a Russian propaganda has had a long history, and real-politik did not only exist in the Allied cold war camp - the Russians, for their sins, are equal and opposite progenitors of this modern day disease. So it's time to shame the Russians, as they are obviously playing out a sick cold war spin in favour of the Gaddafi regime. It seems the cold war antics have not ended.

So lets see - what are the inherent contradictions in this supposition?

It is clear that the Libyan rebels (pro-democracy fighters) are ill-equipped, ill-trained, and not organized enough to take on ground troops that are loyal to Gaddafi. They have fled most battles where they have encountered trained soldiers that know how to conduct a battle. Much emphasis has placed on the inadequacy of the Libyan rebel movement on the ground, and by all satellite television stations, blog spots, tweets, etc. The very reason why an intervention was made is because the rebels were summarily pushed back to Benghazi with the advance of Gaddafi's remaining troops. This, despite the fact that Libyan rebels are also supplemented by defecting army colonels and troops, who should know how to conduct a battle. Yet, by all accounts the Libyan rebels have not fared well and have appeared pretty disorganised in taking on Gaddafi's forces.

One has only to look to Iraq to debunk the idea that there are masses of Al Qaeda trained fighters in Libya, battling alongside civilians, waiting for their chance to take advantage of the power vacuum. In Iraq, the mobilisation of Al Qaeda forces have presented a constant and severe, well organised threat to American forces. Al Qaeda knows how to train fighters and have a long history of battlefield experience in various conflicts. Al Qaeda would not have survived as long as it has if it's actions were undisciplined and unable to mount well planned operations. If Al Qaeda was in Libya in great numbers, we would not see the disorganised, piecemeal resistance from the rebels that we have seen in Libya. Even now, the battle is to and fro. The rebels seem to be relying more on the defection of the army rather than all out battles to win territory. If Al Qaeda was in Libya in weighty numbers, then we would be seeing organised resistance on the ground, and well-trained fighters pushing forward against Gaddafi loyalists. We have not seen this. Instead, we have seen rebels push forward only to retreat quickly whenever they were faced with organised resistance from Gaddafi forces.

Al Qaeda maintained a long term resistance in Iraq that saw almost daily attacks upon American forces. It is an organised network of resistance that knows how to move arms and skilled fighters into conflict areas. Iraq acted as a magnet for Al Qaeda, and what we have seen in Libya does not in the slightest resemble what transpired in Iraq. The attempts that the Russian government in particular has made to paint a picture of a Libyan Afghanistan have been contrived, and if they're not contrived they're not very well thought through. One thing is for certain, the Russian government knows how to think strategically, and it is unlikely that this position has been generated by the strategists. Rather, it is more likely generated by the fearmongers amongst them, who have managed to capitalise on Russian fears over the threat that has emerged from the Caucasus. Moreover, it is politically expedient for the Russians to adopt the stance they have - it absolves them of the responsibility to participate in any action, and at the same time they make themselves more attractive to those that the West have spurned - much like China has managed to do. When the West spurned Robert Mugabe he looked to China for support. And Russia's calculated response is no doubt inspired by the very control of the very same oil reserves they claim that the coalition forces are greedy for. Russia are backing their old friend Gaddafi, and that is what their propaganda is in aid of.

To summarise - it is ridiculous to simultaneously claim that the rebels are disorganised rag tag groups, while at the same time heavily impregnated by Al Qaeda forces. Al Qaeda forces would know how to train and mobilise forces and would themselves be well trained and organised. We have seen none of this, and the Libyan army defectors are the ones conducting the training. While there may be Al Qaeda fighters amongst the Libyan rebels it is hardly likely, judging from their performance on the battelfield that Al Qaeda is a major force in the uprising in Libya. In this sense, recreated fears of a 1979 or Afghanistan styled power vaccuum being usurped by Islamist radicals are misplaced interpretations of the Libyan uprising, and runs the danger of acting as a diagnosis that eventually perpetuates itself. In this respect, what the Russian government is spinning out is dangerous and misleading, and if it is a genuine assessment, is more likely clouded by their own problems with extremists and only emphasizes how well both sides of the cold war divide mirror each other and their mutual paranoias.

Thought Factory: Libya and the Anti-War Left!

Thought Factory: Libya and the Anti-War Left!: "It is striking how similar the reactions of the left to the emerging crisis in Libya have been to the wests initial response to th..."

Libya and the Anti-War Left!

It is striking how similar the reactions of the left to the emerging crisis in Libya have been to the wests initial response to the Egyptian uprisings. At first, the west seemed confused about how to interpret the emerging events in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. Now, it is the global 'left' that mirrors this uncertainty and hesitation. When it came to Egypt the left firmly held the view that Mubarak was a western stooge, and deserved his come-uppance for his tresspasses against the greater 'solidarity' of the Arab world by making peace with Israel and embarking upon a close alliance with imperial powers. It is almost as if there wasn't an equal and opposite player in the cold war, that didn't create monsters of it's own ... a selective blindness of the left allows it to disappear from their vision and to slip through their fingertips. Gaddafi, on the other side of the cold war divide, still has his sympathisers on the left and in this respect the left ultimately mirrors the right that it so desperately tries to outdo.

Yet the illusory safety of old arguments provides little comfort to the left where the unfolding crisis in Libya is concerned. A vast range of theories prevail. NATO is oil greedy and - as in Iraq - have taken advantage of the opportunity in a quest for oil resources. Alternatively, it is the techno-industrial-military complex at work, stimulating war during a recession to create more weapons sales to sustain the complex itself, or it is an attempt to reassert western power as policeman of the world, a mafia godfather attacking a villain to reclaim a tenuous moral advantage over the rest of the world. NATO, vilified by the left, now proceeds amidst a storm of criticism, initially with the US as leader, in reality, a reluctant leader of the military operation to enforce a no-fly zone. 

Yet when one witnesses a Gaddafi speech, imploring the world to believe that the youth are out on the streets because Al Qaeda has drugged them with ecstacy that their coffee and milk has been laced with, even the most ardent lefty must lose confidence in their arguments? Gaddafi might be smart, but he is also senile at best and mad at worst and there is no way around that. And while lefties celebrated the 'revolution' in Egypt openly, they are reluctant to cheer on the UN and especially US and NATO forces in their attempt to intervene upon Gaddafi. After all, Gaddafi might have been a crazy dictator, but he was 'their' crazy dictator, not as bad as the others who worked for the west.

The brazen and violent words and actions spouted by Gaddafi, and his son Saif El Islam, seem to have fallen on the deaf ears within the left, and the grassroots and leadership level calls for action to be taken against the ever-looming purge that Gaddafi was embarking upon also seem not to move the left. They are too busy watching what America and the US are up to, fixated on their old enemy rather than the menace that has emerged within Libya, brought on by its illegitimate regime after 42 years of dictatorship. The conspiracy addicted left, ironically seem unable to hear the calls that have emerged from the Libyan people and their now defected leadership, and many within the left now suggest that a negotiated settlement with Gaddafi would have been more appropriate. Yet again, the left comes to the afterparty with 20-20 hindsight, an easy enough position to assume - a safe moral highground that has nothing to do with what is transpiring on the ground in Libya. Who indeed, can guarantee that Gaddafi - having broken every promise he's made (including self-declared ceasefires), would simply roll over and play dead because he was honoured with negotiations and asked to go nicely (pretty please with a cherry on top)? Who can guarantee that? 

And there is more that the left ignore in their never-ending quest for conspiracy. The US military has consistently bucked Obama on every suggestion he has made since he came to presidency, presumably because one of his campaign promises was to close down Guantanomo Bay, and to pull out of Iraq, into which America should never have gone. The US military did not want to have any part of Libya. They are already overstretched and seem to be trying to concentrate efforts for success in Afghanistan in particular, and are reluctant to disperse their efforts over the globe. Robert Gates, essentially the leader of the US military, has contradicted Obama too regularly for comfort, so the techno-industrial-military complex, if it is represented by the actions of the US military, seem not to be too interested in Libya, and neither are the oil industry, who are also closely linked to the US military.

And this is not all. While Libya was being put under the sword (or more accurately; sniper rifles acquired from South Africa in December, and automatic and anti-aircraft gunfire) by Muammar Gaddafi, another drama was unfolding in Bahrain that has far more significance to regional security that Libya ever could have, no matter how much oil there is in Libya. The movement of Saudi forces into Bahrain to quell uprisings against the Bahraini monarchy raised the eyebrows of Iran, whose government met to discuss unfolding events in Bahrain. Shiites under attack in the middle east, and a vacuum of international action, may have opened the way (justifiably) for Iran to take action. Indeed, Iran could well have cited Kosovo, where it took 7 years before any kind of intervention occurred to put an end to widespread genocide - as an example of the historical failure of the UN to do anything other than make resolutions when people were dying. Rwanda is also a case in point.

It is concievable that the 'rushed' (some say it took too long) UN resolution for a no-fly zone and to protect civilians was put into place to anticipate any claim that Iran might have made to the right to take action. By acting earlier, the UN might be anticipating the strategic movements in the region and be trying to pre-empt any moral 'right' that Iran might invoke to intervene on behalf of civilians in Bahrain. Morality as a reason for intervention or action of any kind is always dangerous, as the question of 'whose morality' should dictate the norms comes into play. Action should be based on principle, and while morality is important in one sense, it is far more important for that morality to be bound by principle, which in the case of UN should be humanitarian principles that are agreed upon at an international level. If the UN cannot do anything to instigate actions that are designed to bring about the security of peoples in crisis, then it has no purpose except as a symbolic, post fact first-world guilt alleviation body.

Several left oriented commentators and researchers have suggested that a negotiated settlement with Gaddafi would have been wiser than declaring him under investigation by the International Criminal Court. Yet this smacks of cold war logic, and neoliberal pragmatism - the very things that the left rail against. Moreover, there is no evidence that this works. Zimbabwe is a good illustration of why negotiated settlements with an entrenched regime can fail the opposition considerably. And accordingly, the consistent message that has emerged throughout the uprisings in the Middle East is the call for dictatorial leaders and their entire regimes to be removed. In this sense, the protesters are seeking system revolution, democractic elections and constitutional change that leads to the entire restructuring of insitututions and government, for the benefit of society. They are not interested in negotiations because they have never had any negotiating power within their dictatorship-led regimes, with no lengthy histories of free civil society mobilisation, and want to have the right to determine their own governance and leadership.

There was a clear call for a no-fly zone from Libyans under attack from Gaddafi forces, and the UN has followed suit, at great risk to its own reputation. I never thought the UN would pass a resolution to intervene, but now that they have, some successive phases can be put in place. If the ground battle continues to be a back and forth affair, then prolonged high frequency conflict may result, while if a wall was put up between the east and west of Libya then a low frequency conflict such as that conducted between Palestine and Israel may result.

The ground battle, as  in the Balkans, might prove intense and horrific, but that will only occur if tribes turn against one another and re-create the village-by-village style of ethnic cleansing that occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo - which at this stage seems unlikely. More likely, rebel soldiers and anti-Gaddafi protesters -turned-revolutionaries will experience fierce ground battles, and the eventual result will be subject to the twists and turns that these singular micro-turf wars take during the course of the Libyan conflict. The no-fly zone only takes out one (though very significant) component in the conflict, but does not level the playing fields. At worst, the rebels will lose entirely to Gaddafi's ground forces and a no-fly zone will be meaningless on the ground. 

However, the UN can pull on more of its resources in order to put peacekeepers on the ground to enforce the keeping of the peace and not just keeping a peace in general. The rules of engagement need to be framed around protecting civilians and territory and not just firing back when fired upon, or defending UN bases and compounds. The UN peacekeeping forces can also clear the way for much needed humanitarian assistance to be brought in, and for elections to be held at local council levels in order to obtain some level of representative governance in the new territories.

If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taught us anything it is that UN resolutions that have no teeth are effectively useless pieces of paper that have no real authority in the world. The UN is a heavily funded organisation, and must earn its role through decisive, clear and principled action. Note that I emphasize that principle, and not morality, should govern their actions to a larger degree. Morality is dangerous as the question of 'whose' morality should prevail cannot be given a straight answer - principle, as articulated by Hannah Arendt, should be the backbone of action. The UN is the only organisation mandated with establishing the principles around which global humanitarian values are based - it is not there to argue for or advance a particular morality, but to achieve consensus on principle and then to act upon those principles for the greater good of the globe.

When it comes to Libya the left have chosen a position of convenience and not one of principle, choosing to re-invoke the quest for conspiracy instead of observing what is transpiring diplomatically, politically and on the ground in Libya. What the Libyan people have called for is consistent with calls throughout the middle east, that is; complete regime change and the end of dictatorship. They don't just want elections, they want to start from a clean slate because existing systems are so corrupt and inept that they just aren't good enough. That is revolution - and it doesn't have to follow any kind of marxist-lennist model in order to have legitimacy as revolution.

Negotiated settlements can also sometimes also work out, but there has to be a pre-willingness for a negotiated settlement, as was the case in South Africa. This has not been the case in Libya or in other Middle Eastern countries for that matter, and the spectre of negotiated settlement has only come up when these regimes have been taken by surprise by widespread revolt, indeed, much as Zanu-PF was surprised when it lost the elections in Zimbabwe. Under these conditions negotiations are not made in good faith, they are made purely to retain control through the structural power of the existing regime. Negotiated settlements, however palatable to the peace-loving left, will not lead to any real change and will open the way for widespread purges after the medias interest moves elsewhere, as we have seen in Zimbabwe. That the left is deaf to what Libyans at all levels are requesting is an reflection on how their own prejudices and long held gripes can blind them to the voices of grassroots uprisings, which ironically; they are quick to claim they represent. One might ask the question, are the lefties actually liberals not far beneath their 'down with the people' exteriors?