There is a
familiar narrative that the current African National Congress (ANC) government
responds to with every crisis that unfolds in the country. Criticism, whether
from the media, the poor, middle classes, or elite are greeted by accusations
of conspiracy, anti-black government racism, or ideological ignorance. The
standard response of government is that it is not responsible for whatever
crisis is unfolding, and that sinister post-Apartheid forces in South African society
are capitalising on the crisis.
The
response to the current tertiary education fee crisis is no different. When
confronted by the students and the media over what course of action he would
take as the Minister of Higher Education and Training, South African Communist
Party Secretary General and ex-trade unionist Blade Nzimande made it clear that
the issue of fee increases had nothing to do with his department, and was
solely the responsibility of the universities. A day later he announced a unilateral
6 per cent cap on fee increases for all universities in a rather quick about turn.
In the days
leading up to Nzimande’s original denial of responsibility, the ANC
spokesperson Zizi Kodwa stated that the student protests were “legitimate”
actions taken against “unreasonable and exclusionary fee increments” that were being
“imposed” by universities. The South African Communist Party website also
proclaimed its support for “the student protest against exorbitant fees and
sky-high fee increments”. The ANC Women’s league and Cosatu (the Council for
South African Trade Unions) also proclaimed their support for the students.
This
inconsistency in government’s role and positioning on key issues of importance
is not new. There is a strong sense that the ruling government, which has
experienced great tensions with many societal institutions in South Africa,
engages in spin-doctoring where they’re perceived ‘enemies’ are attacked. It serves
as precedent to exercise undue control over errant organisations and
institutions that – in its view – undermines its liberation-party narrative and
exposes the inconsistency between its language and actions. Their vocal support
for the #RhodesMustFall movement is a case in point; they did not expect it to
turn against them.
However,
the ruling government cannot escape the steady and increasing public discontent
and societal unrest that has ramped up since 2007. Major service (non) delivery
protests increased from around 14 in 2004 to around 100 per year in 2007, and
reached a high of over 400 in 2013. These are protests conducted by poor and
marginalised communities over service delivery failures by local governments in
their areas. The events at Marikana, where the slaughter of mineworkers by
police was initially praised by the now suspended police commissioner, served
to reinforce the notion that the ruling government had become disconnected from
the plight of ordinary South Africans. In addition, numerous public sector and
private sector strikes have disrupted services and slowed economic growth while
the country’s broad-based worker union COSATU has largely fragmented and fallen
apart over its alliance with the ruling ANC government.
But the key
demographic that has been hamstrung by the antics and arrogance of the ruling
party are the youth. The government schooling system has suffered greatly;
South Africa now ranks second last in the world in mathematics education at
schooling level. Private education is desirable by most parents even though
wages have not kept up with inflation, and spiralling debt has rendered many
household budgets precariously balanced between near poverty and poverty. That
South Africa ranks highest in terms of inequality in the world, only serves to
exacerbate the social tensions in a post-Apartheid society where the previously
excluded, marginalised and exploited have legitimate expectations that their
plight would have improved after more than two decades of democracy. Indeed,
that was the future that was promised to them by the ruling party, and early on
in the post 1994 dispensation (when I was a student) the quest for free
education at all levels was a key point of discontent with the ANC-led
governments neoliberal policies.
Yet the
analysis put forward by some political commentators from the media and
elsewhere seem out of touch with the realities that are driving the agenda for
change in South Africa. Facetious, trite, didactic analyses such as that put forward
by Judith February in her op-ed “Why is the state not the target of student
protests” fail to acknowledge that the students are not politically illiterate,
but have access to a much broader range of information, discursive movements
and potential for networked action than in recent history. As it turned out, the very next day after
the article was published, the students converged upon Parliament in Cape Town,
where the budget speech was due to be given. Indeed, this was followed by a
protest by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who disrupted the parliamentary
session by chanting “Fees Must Fall!” and holding up placards. In turn, the
students, who were protesting at the gates, broke through and stormed the
parliamentary precinct where they were met with teargas and stun grenades.
What is
worrying about such an article (and similar perspectives put forward by
numerous other writers, most notably from the white middle class and business
sector) is that the author appeared to be speaking down to the very
constituency and demographic that has agitated for, and brought about a resurrection
of political action in South Africa. In the past 21 years, there have scarcely been changes of the
magnitude that have unfolded since young political leaders such as Julius
Malema (of the EFF) and Mmusi Maimane (of the Democratic Alliance) have risen
to ascendancy in opposition politics in South Africa. The EFF in particular,
who campaigns on the basis of free education, has much to gain from the
discontent of the youth, as they have no viable political alternatives through
which to find representation.
At the
heart of this lies a distinct generational attitude that has arrested South
African politics since 1994; of an older generation that is out of touch with the
youth of today. It does not matter whether this older generation is in government, the
private sector or civil society; they are often so caught up with their own
legacy that the crises facing the youth of today are cast as frivolous and petty by comparison. They
are deeply mistaken. They seem oblivious of where the major forces for
socio-political change almost always emerge from. Even worker struggles are
often spearheaded by the youth. This much history is consistent about. They are
a critical voice for society, because the future is mostly theirs to live out.
The decisions made today, on their behalf, should not exclude them, and it is
becoming increasingly unlikely that they will allow themselves to be excluded
from power and decision-making to the extent that South African political
elites have become used to.
The ANC-led
government, who sat stoically listening to the budget speech while university
students outside, seemed limp, an elite waiting for their numbers to be up.
And it is only a matter of time before the winds of change come sweeping
through the corridors of power again. It is unwise to underestimate or discount
the people of South Africa and a youth that have now tasted real freedom (i.e.
the freedom to directly take on the state). South Africans may be reluctant to
take action, and they may ordinarily prefer normality to disorder, but when
push comes to shove the entirety of South African society takes action. You underestimate
them at your peril.
P.S. On a
personal note; I haven’t been prouder of South African students in almost two
decades. #FeesMustFall
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