What is Developmental Neopatrimonialism?
The African political condition
has a label. Neopatrimonialism, as it
is termed, refers to a system of rule by an individual and/or political party
that where loyalty is predicated on the distribution of economic rents to
‘clients’. These are individuals, groups, networks and organisations that are linked
in some way or another, that is; through kinship, common purpose or agendas,
social networks, and so forth.
Those in power and those within
the patronage networks are informally linked, even though the distribution of
rents may occur through the formal bureaucratic systems of the state. Hence,
states where neopatrimonialism is prevalent are considered hybrid systems,
where formal and informal networks operate to secure power and access to rents
and resources. While neopatrimonialism has taken root in many different parts
of the world, postcolonial African states are – by and large – regarded as
typified by neopatrimonialism.
In classical economics and politics, neopatrimonialism
is frowned upon. It is regarded as symptomatic of bad governance, misallocation
of resources, maladministration, corruption and other ills that plague
dysfunctional states. This is especially the case where Africa is concerned. Debates
rage, however, on everything from the developmental utility of neopatrimonialism,
to the precise definitions and typologies that the deployment of the term
should be restricted to (based on empirical evidence).
As recently as 2011, Tim Kelsall argued[1]
that under certain conditions neo-patrimonialism can yield positive economic
growth and commensurate developmental outcomes, stating that, “crucial to
making neopatrimonialism work for development in Africa has been a system for
centralising economic rents and gearing their management to the long term”.
Kelsall, cautions, however, that “developmental patrimonialism has a limited
shelf life and will not be appropriate everywhere” and stresses that it is not
a “’one-size fits all’ solution”.
He list three reasons why. First,
that neopatrimonialism seems to work best in the least developed countries
where “relatively simple economic structures are more responsive to
relationship-based governance”. Second, that it is unlikely to work in all
political systems, and that in countries with regular democratic change rent
administration will likely be oriented towards short-term outcomes and that
centralisation of rents in these cases “would be likely to prove very controversial
and damaging”. Third, that the centralisation of rents in countries where a few
large “ethnic groups” compete for power would likely prove “exceedingly
difficult”.
The view that neopatrimonial
developmentalism may yield positive developmental outcomes is regarded as a
heterodox economics view (i.e. opposed to classical economics). It is important
to acknowledge that developmental neopatrimonialism is, in reality, a diagnosis
and not an approach. It is a phenomenon that economists are in the process of
understanding, and not a theoretical prescription for how states should
function. That is, it is not normative in its orientation. That is the reason
why Kelsall cautions so strongly against its use as a prescription beyond
strictly bounded conditions.
Neopatrimonialsim: A Prescription for South Africa?
Where South Africa is concerned
the deployment of developmental neopatrimonialism as both a diagnostic
framework, as well as a prescriptive framework, should be undertaken with great
caution. There are many reasons why South Africa cannot be understood or
classified in terms of developmental patrimonialism.
It should be self-evident that in
the case of South Africa does not meet the criteria for neopatrimonial
developmentalism even though traces of neopatrimonialism do inhabit the
political and business realms. South Africa is; (1) is relatively highly
developed in relation to the rest of Africa (indeed, it is regarded as a
transitional economy alongside countries such as Brazil), (2) has strong democratic
processes and independent state institutions, and (3) is ethnically, racially
diverse and relatively class diverse, and cosmopolitan. These attributes place
it outside of the neopatrimonial state that Tim Kelsall writes about.
Yet, there is an emerging current
that seeks to justify neopatrimonial developmentalism as a legitimate framework
for the transformative agenda that the ANC seeks to achieve. This relies on the
assumption that the ANC, with its electoral dominance, may serve as a
centralised administrator of rents in service of a transformative agenda, led
by a strong, uncompromising leader or leadership.
It is true that the electoral
dominance of the African National Congress, which has ruled since the advent of
democracy in 1994, may offer some hope of centralised administration of rents
into the long term as a developmental strategy for the future. However, given
the fragmented and fractured internal politics of the ANC it is a vain hope to
imagine that the ANC would continue ruling unchallenged and without significant
internal splitting in the medium to long terms. Indeed, open dissent and
threats of imminent split from the ANC tripartite alliance are now common,
everyday occurrences, with both the Council of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
and the South African Communist Party (SACP) expressing daily outrage at the
status quo of the ANC’s current leadership. The ANC may have ruled for
twenty-two years, but it will not likely rule for as long moving forward.
Moreover, the developmental utility
of neopatrimonialism is largely gauged and assessed in economic terms. The limitations of adopting an economic
worldview on what is a profoundly social and political matter must be made
clear and reconciled if any kind of neopatrimonial developmental state is to be
socially and politically transformative in the true sense i.e. enabling the
destabilisation and reconfiguration of inherited hierarchies, power imbalances
and structural inequalities that prevail in South Africa.
Should the neopatrimonial developmental
state merely reinforce and/or recreate similar hierarchical disparities (i.e.
in terms of power, wealth, inequality, access, mobility, etc.) then it remains
largely a political ruse that in reality masks a program that reproduces the
status quo. And it is clear in South Africa right now that the status quo is
untenable. Twenty-two years into the ‘new’ democratic dispensation, social and
political fragmentation and national disunity prevail alongside deep political
turmoil and uncertainty. The state and polis have become stuck. Concerned politicians
are looking outward to society for the solution to the political crisis. They
want a revival of 1980’s style rolling mass action to place pressure on the ANC
leadership. Thus far, nothing has yielded significant results. The long road,
it is evident, has become the priority. Clearing up the mess, however, will
likely take a long time.
The ever present danger of a
shape-shifting state is an important and critical factor to account for in any
conception of South Africa as a neopatrimonial developmental state. South
Africa is historically characterised by high levels of structural inequality
that delineates along unmistakeably racial lines today. South Africa today
still displays its apartheid inheritance in patterns of wealth, poverty,
spatial segregation, land and housing ownership, access, mobility and
drastic socio-economic inequality.
Indeed, the postcolonial
Apartheid state relied on the administration of rents to maintain minority
rule, and to maintain economic dominance of the white settler minority. Rents
were administered in service of lifting poor whites out of poverty and
into stable, relatively middle class livelihoods and incomes. Rents were also
administered to create and maintain the Afrikaans private sector. Race-based
laws and ideologies were instrumental in ensuring that both the state and the
private sector reinforced and reproduced this program of white power. This
entrenched structural race-based inequality in South Africa both socially and
economically.
While the Apartheid state did not
strictly fit the mould of developmental neopatrimonialism, it did administer
rents as a transformative socio-political and developmental agenda. It appears
as though, the same logic is being applied to actualise the transformative
agenda that the ANC seeks to bring about today i.e. ‘radical economic
transformation’. Radical economic transformation seeks to create a new black
industrial class (i.e. “100 black industrialists”) through administering the
R500Bn state procurement budget preferentially to black business. This agenda
seeks to take black economic empowerment beyond mere ownership in the financial
economy, to full participation in the productive economy of South Africa.
The agenda to increase black
ownership of the productive economy of South Africa is not, in itself, problematic.
What is problematic is the notion that this will automatically alleviate the
suffering of the majority of poor black people in South Africa; that their
lives will be transformed through this agenda. Moreover, it is also problematic
to embrace a neopatrimonial model, in which rents are administered through a
small power-elite, led by a ‘strongman’ styled ruler. In my view, this
perspective is disastrous and anti-democratic. Real radical transformation
would strengthen both the political and economic processes through which South
African democracy is administered and not treat them as trade-offs.
That is, we would not seek to
weaken the political realm in order to strengthen black economic participation.
We are being presented with a false binary here. We should be seeking to
strengthen both bottom-up, grassroots participation in political
decision-making and governance, and
boost economic inclusion at the same time. That is what would constitute a truly transformative agenda.
Developmental patrimonialism is a
poor diagnostic and prescriptive framework for South Africa. It is a diagnosed
phenomenon. It is not visionary, and is not – in any sense – new. It is merely
newly diagnosed and appraised. It is, in many ways, a 20th Century
framework, one that is an extremely poor normative framework for where we
should be headed in the 21st Century. The danger in adopting it as a
prescriptive framework – in any measure – is that it may reproduce more of the
same while promising a different result.
To get something new, you have to
think and act anew. Developmental neopatrimonialism, as a prescriptive
framework, is an idea that is hopelessly out of touch with the 21st
Century; its movements (i.e. political, technological, social, cultural, etc.)
and its potentials. The neglected direction is simply asking; what kind of
democracy is desirable and possible in South Africa that can ensure a better
future for all who live within it given the potentials afforded by 21st
Century developments? It is asking how democracy can evolve to hold power to
account, and ensure that power and
wealth is more fairly and evenly distributed throughout society.
The means to hold power to
account, being active in the space of power, and thereby revitalising the polis
are emerging in the 21st Century. Liquid democracy, radical municipalism and other visions for enhanced local power, and inclusive participatory-based
developmentalism and governance are some examples. In these new forms of
democracy, power is increasingly decentralised and distributed. Developmental
and political visions are to be informed and regulated by new forms of
grassroots power and not merely acquiescent to the state and elected
government. They are attempts at finding the means to overcome the failures of
representative democracy and the difficulties of direct democracy. They are
attempts to move democracy beyond the status of the “best-worst system” as it
is regularly referred to as these days.
It is perhaps worth reminding
ourselves that South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in
the world. In this spirit, it is time to take up a new challenge; that of
evolving our democracy into a system that is truly progressive in how it
allocates and administers power and decision-making. Democracy in South Africa
needs to be closer to the people, and in order for this to become a reality that
goes beyond merely holding local Indaba’s and conducting formulating Integrated
Development Plans. 21st Century ideas, technologies and systems need
to be embraced.
We are increasingly living in a world where new
possibilities are emerging and will inevitably impact the norms that prevailed
in the 20th Century. True leadership, that is in touch with and
acutely aware of the changes that are unfolding in this century and their vast
implications, would recognise that need to begin testing and building the
mechanisms that will enable democracy to evolve and meet the needs of the 21st
Century. While the benefits of neopatrimonial developmentalism are acknowledged
as actualisable only under very specific – and limited – conditions, the
possibilities that the 21st Century offers to improve democratic
processes and practises are many and varied. Surely this warrants closer
attention, scrutiny and consideration? We cannot merely consider old
prescriptions when facing a fundamentally new future. Surely our innovative and
creative capacity should be put to work in service of what the future offers
rather than the past.
[1]
Kelsall, T. (2011). Developmental Patrimonialism? Rethinking Business and
Politics in Africa, Africa Power and Politics, Policy Brief 02, June 2011.
