Storm Clouds Brewing in South Africa: Forgotten Promises and the Post-Apartheid Youth

There is a familiar narrative that the current African National Congress (ANC) government responds to with every crisis that unfolds in the country. Criticism, whether from the media, the poor, middle classes, or elite are greeted by accusations of conspiracy, anti-black government racism, or ideological ignorance. The standard response of government is that it is not responsible for whatever crisis is unfolding, and that sinister post-Apartheid forces in South African society are capitalising on the crisis.

The response to the current tertiary education fee crisis is no different. When confronted by the students and the media over what course of action he would take as the Minister of Higher Education and Training, South African Communist Party Secretary General and ex-trade unionist Blade Nzimande made it clear that the issue of fee increases had nothing to do with his department, and was solely the responsibility of the universities. A day later he announced a unilateral 6 per cent cap on fee increases for all universities in a rather quick about turn.

In the days leading up to Nzimande’s original denial of responsibility, the ANC spokesperson Zizi Kodwa stated that the student protests were “legitimate” actions taken against “unreasonable and exclusionary fee increments” that were being “imposed” by universities. The South African Communist Party website also proclaimed its support for “the student protest against exorbitant fees and sky-high fee increments”. The ANC Women’s league and Cosatu (the Council for South African Trade Unions) also proclaimed their support for the students.

This inconsistency in government’s role and positioning on key issues of importance is not new. There is a strong sense that the ruling government, which has experienced great tensions with many societal institutions in South Africa, engages in spin-doctoring where they’re perceived ‘enemies’ are attacked. It serves as precedent to exercise undue control over errant organisations and institutions that – in its view – undermines its liberation-party narrative and exposes the inconsistency between its language and actions. Their vocal support for the #RhodesMustFall movement is a case in point; they did not expect it to turn against them.

However, the ruling government cannot escape the steady and increasing public discontent and societal unrest that has ramped up since 2007. Major service (non) delivery protests increased from around 14 in 2004 to around 100 per year in 2007, and reached a high of over 400 in 2013. These are protests conducted by poor and marginalised communities over service delivery failures by local governments in their areas. The events at Marikana, where the slaughter of mineworkers by police was initially praised by the now suspended police commissioner, served to reinforce the notion that the ruling government had become disconnected from the plight of ordinary South Africans. In addition, numerous public sector and private sector strikes have disrupted services and slowed economic growth while the country’s broad-based worker union COSATU has largely fragmented and fallen apart over its alliance with the ruling ANC government.

But the key demographic that has been hamstrung by the antics and arrogance of the ruling party are the youth. The government schooling system has suffered greatly; South Africa now ranks second last in the world in mathematics education at schooling level. Private education is desirable by most parents even though wages have not kept up with inflation, and spiralling debt has rendered many household budgets precariously balanced between near poverty and poverty. That South Africa ranks highest in terms of inequality in the world, only serves to exacerbate the social tensions in a post-Apartheid society where the previously excluded, marginalised and exploited have legitimate expectations that their plight would have improved after more than two decades of democracy. Indeed, that was the future that was promised to them by the ruling party, and early on in the post 1994 dispensation (when I was a student) the quest for free education at all levels was a key point of discontent with the ANC-led governments neoliberal policies.

Yet the analysis put forward by some political commentators from the media and elsewhere seem out of touch with the realities that are driving the agenda for change in South Africa. Facetious, trite, didactic analyses such as that put forward by Judith February in her op-ed “Why is the state not the target of student protests” fail to acknowledge that the students are not politically illiterate, but have access to a much broader range of information, discursive movements and potential for networked action than in recent history. As it turned out, the very next day after the article was published, the students converged upon Parliament in Cape Town, where the budget speech was due to be given. Indeed, this was followed by a protest by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who disrupted the parliamentary session by chanting “Fees Must Fall!” and holding up placards. In turn, the students, who were protesting at the gates, broke through and stormed the parliamentary precinct where they were met with teargas and stun grenades.

What is worrying about such an article (and similar perspectives put forward by numerous other writers, most notably from the white middle class and business sector) is that the author appeared to be speaking down to the very constituency and demographic that has agitated for, and brought about a resurrection of political action in South Africa. In the past 21 years, there have scarcely been changes of the magnitude that have unfolded since young political leaders such as Julius Malema (of the EFF) and Mmusi Maimane (of the Democratic Alliance) have risen to ascendancy in opposition politics in South Africa. The EFF in particular, who campaigns on the basis of free education, has much to gain from the discontent of the youth, as they have no viable political alternatives through which to find representation.   

At the heart of this lies a distinct generational attitude that has arrested South African politics since 1994; of an older generation that is out of touch with the youth of today. It does not matter whether this older generation is in government, the private sector or civil society; they are often so caught up with their own legacy that the crises facing the youth of today are cast as frivolous and petty by comparison. They are deeply mistaken. They seem oblivious of where the major forces for socio-political change almost always emerge from. Even worker struggles are often spearheaded by the youth. This much history is consistent about. They are a critical voice for society, because the future is mostly theirs to live out. The decisions made today, on their behalf, should not exclude them, and it is becoming increasingly unlikely that they will allow themselves to be excluded from power and decision-making to the extent that South African political elites have become used to.

The ANC-led government, who sat stoically listening to the budget speech while university students outside, seemed limp, an elite waiting for their numbers to be up. And it is only a matter of time before the winds of change come sweeping through the corridors of power again. It is unwise to underestimate or discount the people of South Africa and a youth that have now tasted real freedom (i.e. the freedom to directly take on the state). South Africans may be reluctant to take action, and they may ordinarily prefer normality to disorder, but when push comes to shove the entirety of South African society takes action. You underestimate them at your peril.

P.S. On a personal note; I haven’t been prouder of South African students in almost two decades. #FeesMustFall     

     

Thought Factory: Quicksand Diplomacy: The Muddy Dynamics of Politic...

Thought Factory: Quicksand Diplomacy: The Muddy Dynamics of Politic...: While the signs of a failing political leadership and government in South Africa are all too evident on the surface, it has become increasi...

Quicksand Diplomacy: The Muddy Dynamics of Political Survival in the New SA

While the signs of a failing political leadership and government in South Africa are all too evident on the surface, it has become increasingly difficult to identify and follow the thread that runs through the failures that reach all the way from local government to the very leadership at the top.

President Jacob Zuma has surely attracted the lion’s share of the blame, but this is perhaps not without good reason. When considering the failing systems of both political accountability and delivery, there is a persistent and nagging question – relating to President Zuma’s own chequered past and currently embattled leadership – that may help unlock some of the reasons why these failures are recurrent in the Zuma presidency. The question is simply;

“How has Jacob Zuma survived scandal after scandal without stepping down or being removed from office?”

Despite the generous reading of the political astuteness of the president by commentators such as Justice Malala, our president has not survived scandal after scandal by deft political or diplomatic manoeuvres, charm, or outright intimidation and assassination of opponents. He has not survived by securing the support of foreign powers who entrench his position through their influence, either overtly or through covert ‘back-room diplomacy’. He has not survived through sheer force of personality and propaganda that hails him as “the great leader”, as an irreplaceable organ of the nation state.

He is not a Silvio Berlusconi, nor is he a Nixon or Stalin. He is, by all means, a rather mild leader, one who leads by consensus for the most part, and defers to those around him on issues of policy, vision and strategy. If anything, he is more like a gentle patriarch, who oversees a large extended family of varying and differing interests where conflict and jealousy often arise. Yet he seems to float above and ride out every scandal that he is implicated in, and slips through all attempts to pin him down with relative ease. Indeed, he seems to smile through every attack that accompanies each new scandal.

Every scandal that the president is embroiled in begins with breaking news, escalates into outrage in the media, and hits government, which absorbs it like a gigantic sponge. The scandal, which begins as a raging torrent is initially stalled, and then dissipates slowly as it is dragged into the never-ending crevices of the bureaucracy of the state. It is as though each scandal loses momentum and becomes stuck, bogged down in mud, and eventually fades into the background of daily affairs, slowly sinking further into the unforgiving terrain. The scandal is never fully acknowledged by the president; he usually avoids making any comment on the scandals that he is named in. The scandals are never acknowledged as serious political threats that require immediate and urgent attention.

In contrast, his loyal government allies are usually quick to dismiss all claims of scandal and intrigue as mere attempts to undermine a black government and the legacy of the ANC. They usually bat off the criticism and place the blame at the feet of the opposition, the liberal media and those who are labelled supporters of “white privilege”. They are like a large American football team, who rally against every ‘attack’ to give their quarterback enough time and space to make a good throw. And each time the president has been given this space, he takes full advantage of it. With each new scandal he has entrenched himself further and made himself more immovable.

It is truly remarkable, because the president doesn’t really have to lift a finger. The entire system of government seems to transform itself to service the agenda of his survival whenever a new ‘threat’ arises. The president’s survival has not come about through dramatic court cases or parliamentary and public inquiries. It has come about through the endless capacity of the state bureaucracy to stymie, absorb and dissipate unwanted realities that it prefers to avoid dealing with. President Jacob Zuma has survived mainly because key organs of the state are able to raise technicalities and identify loopholes for him.

It is likely that his sycophants take on the responsibility of ‘defending the fort’ on their own accord. It is most likely that they – quite rightly – conflate his survival with theirs, as the precedent that was set at Polokwane was that abrupt leadership change would soon be followed by a purge within the ranks. Without him, where do they go? And when one questions the credentials of the current leadership, there are many cadres in positions that they are clearly ill qualified for. The main reason they are there, is because of their loyalty to the president, and the benefits they reap for that loyalty.

If the ANC wanted the president removed from office they could have made it happen a long time ago. There have certainly been more than enough reasons to recall the president from office. Thabo Mbeki, by comparison, was recalled for significantly weaker and lesser reasons than Jacob Zuma has provided the ANC with. The simple reason that they do not remove him is because once he goes, it is likely that they will follow. That is why the ANC leadership has closed ranks, and engendered a culture of blind loyalty within its structures. It is the main reason why the ANC is unable to question its own leader without fear or favour, and why nobody has been able to openly state that the “emperor has no clothes”. They all need to play along in order to ensure their own political survival.

The potential outcomes of this breakdown of accountability within the ANC are deep and far reaching for the country and South African politics. What is clear is that in the absence of the ability of the ANC to regulate its own leadership, it will become increasingly difficult to play along with the idea that a vote for the ANC is a vote for an institution with a long history and legacy that can be depended upon to counter its internal problems. It will certainly continue to lose votes, but it is conceivable that this could worsen significantly amongst urban voters, who now constitute the majority voter-ship in SA. The Zuma presidency may well be the catalyst that ultimately leads to the decline of the ANC as a major political force in South Africa. Worse, it may lead to a situation where the ANC loses all real political legitimacy and becomes a ZANU-PF styled disaster, ruling endlessly while doing enormous damage to the country as a whole.

What is clear, however, is that the ruling parties “guidebook to political survival” has been written in the Zuma presidency. And it is not just the leaders at the top who have learnt these new survival tactics. It has permeated government at all levels of leadership and decision-making from the very top to the bottom. It is now commonplace for gross violations of public office to be met with nothing more than a slap on the wrist and a lateral transfer to another department, or worse, rewarded with a promotion later down the line, after the mud sets in.

Time and time again we see those who should resign their positions dig their heels in, confident that the mud of bureaucracy will serve them, and that the far-reaching tentacles of their large, ‘majoritarian’ rule will ensure their survival. Majority rule has failed the country; it has rendered the state and government incapacitated and unaccountable, unable to regulate itself sufficiently to ensure competent governance.

The president has come to embody the compromised state of leadership and government that South Africans now endure. Time will tell what future awaits us, but what is clear is that the safeguards that secure and protect the separation of powers, especially between the state and the government, requires an entire rethink. We, as a country, state and government cannot possibly survive another Zuma-style presidency.

***Note that this article was first written and published on this blog in 2011.

Thought Factory: The Legacy of Polokwane: A Deepening Generation Ga...

Thought Factory: The Legacy of Polokwane: A Deepening Generation Ga...: When the ANC toppled its longest serving president in Polokwane in December 2007 at its 52 nd National Conference, the internal ‘coup’ was...

The Legacy of Polokwane: A Deepening Generation Gap

When the ANC toppled its longest serving president in Polokwane in December 2007 at its 52^nd National Conference, the internal ‘coup’ was both celebrated and denounced in equal measure. The images of an internal party revolt, which manifested in open jeering, singing and toy-toying - directed at the then ANC leadership - shook the entire nation. Jacob Zuma was elected party president, and a new National Executive Committee (NEC) (which eventually recalled the sitting president Thabo Mbeki the following year) was voted in.

To many ANC loyalists, it signaled the beginning of the end of the ANC that they knew and loved. For them, its carefully cultivated post-liberation identity, which emphasized its moral authority, professionalism and dignity, was now giving way to populism and crudity instead. To the supporters of the ‘coup’ a new, left-leaning leadership that would faithfully represent the burning needs of ‘the people’ was set to emerge, and Jacob Zuma was the ideal leader. He was consensus driven and representative of the everyday common man.  He was not like the erstwhile ‘stuck up’ intelligentsia that had previously held the reins of the ANC.

Polokwane set in motion an irreversible change, which has ultimately led to the conditions that we find ourselves in today as a country. At the time, I was moved to write an article, which was entitled “Zuma’s precarious balancing act” by the Weekend Argus. In it, I warned against the dangers of mobilising the mob as a force in South African politics, because its dangers had the potential to quickly outweigh its expediency and short-term benefits. Perhaps it was the unbridled arrogance and peculiar over-sensitivity to criticism of the new ANC NEC that allowed it to overlook the dangers of the path they had chosen to tread. Perhaps it was short-termism or short-sightedness. Whatever the case, the new ANC NEC failed to grasp the relevance of what had transpired at Polokwane, and what it had unleashed in our political sphere.

The generational gap that had grown between older anti-apartheid era ANC members, and its newer, younger, more outspoken youth base; had reached a critical point. The new ANC NEC had mobilised this frustrated, impatient constituency as a vehicle for its own convenience, but failed to address the core issues that the youth were concerned with. Julius Malema, then leader of the ANC youth league, proclaimed his support for Jacob Zuma with the words that he was “prepared to kill for Jacob Zuma”.

The middle classes – and especially whites who have never been able to shake the fear of black uprising – drew a collective breath. The “kill” rhetoric had been invoked again. The revolutionary “kill the boer!” rhetoric had already created consternation and a reaction from various elements of civil society. Now, the youth league (and the leader of COSATU; Zwelinzima Vavi) had invoked violent imagery in their defence of Jacob Zuma. The message was ‘hands off our president, or else!’

When pushed to clarify exactly what the ‘or else’ part of their message meant in real terms they both retreated into semantics, equating their ‘willingness to die’ for Jacob Zuma with their ‘willingness to kill’ for him. Notwithstanding that this made no sense at all – that a willingness to die for beliefs did not equate to killing for them – it was swallowed up and readily digested by a public who just wanted things to return to normal, and for all this talk to go away.

This absurd reasoning has since characterised much of the ANC NEC’s stance on every issue that has presented a challenge to them. For a period of time, the ANC youth league went along with these performances, acquiring an autocratic aura where scathing proclamations dominated their communications, instead of well-reasoned arguments. No distinction was made between evidence and anecdote, or between theory and practise, and a politics of irony and whitewashing quickly entrenched itself. The ANC had become an impenetrable fortress, “a revolutionary house”, carefully guarded by a paranoid NEC, SACP, COSATU and Youth League. However, internally it was a house divided, and it never quite recovered from the ruptures that Polokwane brought with it.

Ultimately the cracks began to show. Julius Malema and Zwelinzima Vavi found themselves increasingly side-lined and outmanoeuvred (and even in conflict with each other). The unholy trinity that the ANC prides itself on has now all but disintegrated. Now only a farcical enactment of unity remains, propped up by empty rhetoric and tired, outdated, self-referencing clichés. But the lesson that Polokwane brought to a younger generation of marginalised, frustrated cadres was not forgotten.

Whereas there were only 13 service delivery protests in 2004, by 2012 there were well over 400, averaging around 100 per year leading up to the present***. While people may vote for the ANC, they have learnt that the only way they can get the ANC to act on its electoral promises is through open confrontation, and even violence. This, simply put, is clear evidence that our democracy is failing the very people that it was intended to represent.

“You have to fight for what you stand for” is Julius Malema’s clear message to the large, emerging youth bulge demographic. The EFF is not another COPE. It is not a DA. It is the first truly representative black opposition movement in parliament, and it has clearly demonstrated that it intends to achieve its vision through open confrontation and direct pressure, not negotiation and compromise. It will go the extra mile to bring about the changes it seeks, and won’t take no for an answer. It is very consistent with its origins. The lessons that Polokwane taught the next generation, is that change can be effected through open confrontation, intimidation, provocation and unrest.

The next generation has a few more lessons to teach the self-satisfied ex-heroes of the struggle who - despite their best efforts - cannot remain in power forever. The challenges will intensify, and we will reach new breaking points. The writing is on the wall; a new force has emerged and it will seek out and exploit every opportunity that it can to topple the ANC leadership that it believes has betrayed them, and the leader and leadership they helped put in power.

The only long term survival strategy that the ANC can realistically adopt is to draw the EFF back into its fold. In order to do that, a repeat of Polokwane is required. But it will have to take the form of many small Polokwanes such as what we recently witnessed in parliament. They will snap at the heels of the president until he slips and falls. Then they will go for the jugular, and the very man they swore to “kill” for will likely become their most celebrated victim, even more than Thabo Mbeki, who now cuts a very respectable figure by comparison to the man who replaced him.

The chant, “pay back the money!” has already rooted itself firmly in the collective psyche. It will be followed by other chants, and in the same way as “Umshini-wam” was invoked as a rallying cry to defend the president, these new chants will increasingly draw attention to the hollow spin doctoring that our politics is now infected by. As Julius Malema put it in an interview with e-tv, “It is the beginning of many, many actions to be taken against President Zuma, so that he is held accountable”. Ironically, Polokwane means “place of safety”. After December 2007, no place is safe anymore in South Africa, not even parliament, and we had all better get used to it. 

***Assessments of service delivery protests vary between sources and different criteria are used to classify them, so the figures accounting for service delivery protests in South Africa are to be regarded as rough approximations of a general trend i.e. the figures for different years are not directly comparable. The figures cited in this article are taken from an Institute for Security Studies media briefing entitled "Community Protests 2004-2013: Some Research Findings" released on the 12th of February 2013 by the Social Change Research Unit, Authors Prof Peter Alexander, Dr Carin Runciman and Mr Trevor Ngwane (see https://www.issafrica.org/ and search for report). Note that the other often used data set is called Municipal IQ (see reference 3 below).

Some additional sources are listed here for the reader:

1. http://mg.co.za/article/2014-02-12-research-shows-sharp-increase-in-service-delivery-protests

2. http://www.cetri.be/Rebellion-of-the-poor-South-Africa?lang=fr

3. http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/documents/Jolobe2014-CrisisLocalGovernment.pdf

4. http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Study-finds-protests-are-spiralling-20120617

5. http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/05/11/service-delivery-protests-on-track-for-new-peak-level-in-2016-

6. http://mg.co.za/article/2016-06-07-new-stats-show-that-nine-out-of-11-protests-a-day-are-peaceful

Exceptionalism, Hegemony and the UNSC Godfathers

Exceptionalism, Hegemony and the UNSC Godfathers

The United Nations secretary general Ban Ki Moon recently announced that the much awaited upcoming report on whether chemical weapons were used in Syria would indeed confirm that they were used. He also stated that President Bashar Al Assad had already committed many crimes against humanity.  He did not go so far as to accuse the Syrian government of the recent 21^st August chemical weapons attack, but the implication of the remark is significant.

A few days ago, the Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, warning the USA to respect the United Nations Security Council as the main authority that decides when, and when not, war can be waged in a non-self defence capacity by any nation. He also implored the USA to guard against inadvertently supporting Al Qaeda militants, who supplement the ranks of the opposition to the Syrian government (even though the extent of their involvement is disputed). He ended by mounting a scathing attack on the notion of “American exceptionalism”, which allows the USA to justify taking unilateral action on global issues of critical importance to planetary security and stability.

Putin made no mention of the deadlock that arrests the UNSC whenever conflict plays out in drastic and brutal measure, and requires an international response. Very rarely, if ever, do the Russians and Chinese see ‘eye to eye’ with the USA on what course of action is necessary or appropriate in these circumstances. Essentially, issues that arise over global and regional security concerns become ‘political footballs’ with which the small pool of key actors in the struggle for global domination play out their struggle to dominate each other. In the quest for power, the focus on what is best for a particular country or region is lost, and instead, a shameful display of chest beating emerges and takes centre stage, as the divisions in the security council play out.

Syria and Syrians - who have endured 100,000 deaths, 4 million internally displaced persons and 2 million refugees who have fled across the border, as well as chemical weapons, open warfare with conventional weapons in the streets of its cities and neighbourhoods, summary executions, torture, suppression of the press, siege and starvation conditions, the suppression of the press, and possibly myriad other crimes against humanity that will be revealed years after the conflict has ended - seem to be on the fringes of the spat that is playing out between China and Russia (and BRICS nations) on the one side, and the USA and France on the other. More recently, the Netherlands has thrown its weight behind the USA-France coalition.

So with Russia casting itself as the protector of the role of the United Nations and the rule of international law, it itself is then bound to act within the framework of the United Nations and international law. Surely this would also imply that if the Syrian government, admittedly a close ally and one of the last footholds of Russia’s regional power in the Middle East, were accused of being guilty of crimes against humanity by the highest authority in the United Nations (Ban Ki Moon), that it is then Russia’s duty to respect, or at the very least entertain the position of the United Nations.

But so far, Russia has refused to acknowledge that the Syrian government has committed war crimes, and has used chemical weapons, and has instead emphasized that its intelligence (i.e. Russia’s) indicates that the opposition is a hotbed of Al-Qaeda jihadists and Islamic extremists, and has accused the opposition of deploying chemical weapons in its own rebel-held territories to manufacture consent for an international intervention. In this, Russia is engaging in duplicitous diplomacy, and is in essence rejecting the UN-held position that the Syrian government is responsible for crimes against humanity. In essence, Russia is adopting a stance which emphasizes its very own sense of ‘exceptionalism’.  All that this reveals, is that Russia is equally prone to the very same hegemonic narrative that proponents of global hegemony adopt, when it suits their interests.

Bashar Al Assad has presided over the greatest human-induced tragedy of the 21^st Century thus far. It does indeed set a precedent for how the international community will handle such events in the future. A key question in this regard is, how far have we come in respect of ensuring that genocides, unjust wars and crimes against humanity are stopped while they are occurring? The biggest lament in respect of these tragedies – i.e. such as Kosovo and Rwanda – is that action is always taken too late, and that great loss of life ensues in the interim period where global power politics takes centre stage instead of the people who are being directly affected. Something is not working in the construction and the role of the UNSC. It is time to admit that and correct it. I would go further, and state that the UNSC needs to be drastically revised in terms of composition and that the right to veto is accompanied by the need to take responsibility and face penalties, in particular; when veto action results in the further facilitation, perpetuation and/or escalation of human tragedy.

In particular, any ‘godfather’ type protection afforded to states that commit crimes against humanity, by an ally in the UN needs to be acknowledged and prosecuted accordingly. It cannot be acceptable that a state can be accused of “crimes against humanity” by the highest authority in the UN, and at the same time receive protection by a UNSC member who goes further to dispute that these crimes are being committed by its ally. If Russia has clear evidence that the Al Assad government is innocent of these crimes then it should – as it required of the USA – make this evidence available to the UN and the UNSC members. Fair is fair, and if Russia argues that its only intention is to uphold international law and protect the role of the UN and UNSC, then it itself must abide by the findings and pronouncements of the UN, even when it disagrees with it.

The Russian attempt to thwart military strikes by the US on Syria has taken the form of a deal to get Syria to give up its chemical weapons for destruction. However, this has very quickly morphed into a protracted negotiations over what the conditions for disarmament would be. Syria now wants to be in charge of destroying its own chemical weapons stockpile. It also wants a guarantee that it will not be attacked by the USA if it gives up its weapons. Pretty soon, we will yet again be trapped in a series of scuppered disarmament processes a-la Saddam Hussein. It is clear that this whole charade is just an attempt to ensure that the imminent attack on Syria is thwarted, and to buy time so that the Syrian government can intensify its attacks on rebel held territories and positions. In all likelihood, the real calculation that is unfolding here, is how much time is required to obliterate and crush the rebels and opposition groups to the Syrian government. The Syrian government is hoping for a distraction, and the disarmament agenda is an ideal decoy. While the world will become locked, entangled and embroiled in negotiations with a government that has already committed numerous crimes against humanity over the course of the civil war thus far, it will continue to intensify its own activities.

On the other hand, the USA – now minus its own exceptionalism – will also ‘win’ its own victory. Obama can rightfully claim that he used the ‘threat of force’ effectively in this situation. If the goal is to rid Al Assad’s government of its chemical weapons, so that the potential of a regional escalation is reduced, then the USA has been very successful indeed. It has managed to get Syria to hand over its weapons without firing a single bullet, let alone a cruise or tomahawk missile. The political spin machines will have no problem turning this into a victory for the new mode of American exceptionalism; Obama’s threat of force and brinkmanship will be hailed as a new, cost effective method of enforcement.  The USA is still the policeman of the world, and Russia has successfully cast itself as a protector of international law and the UN. Everybody wins, except the Syrians that this is all supposed to protect, that is.  

What is clear, from recent events, including the Russian attempt to get Syria to give up and destroy its chemical weapons, is that the UNSC is a symbol of global ‘exceptionalism’ itself. It is a group of godfathers who decide for the world. Their battle for domination in a new world order is what drives global political wrangling over issues that are critical for global security and humanitarianism. It isn’t working for those who are dying, on both sides of the Syrian conflict. As a global community, we need an alternative and a new way of going about solving conflict-driven humanitarian crises that are of global importance. The movement of cold war actors into a ‘cold peace’ of sorts has done little to improve the effectiveness of the UNSC in resolving critical security and humanitarian issues. Instead, we’ve dragged a dysfunctional unit of the past too far with us. It’s time to seriously call into question the whole concept of the UNSC itself, and to decide what reforms, or even complete overhauls are necessary to improve the ability of the international community to act when it is needed to prevent loss of life.

As we enter a new era of global politics and global community and society, some critical thought needs to be given to what serves our interests best as a global community. Sovereignty must be respected, but so must international law and standards. We have the power to decide what kind of world we live in, and how best to handle our differences, as well as conflict driven humanitarian crises. Global institutions need to be constructed in such a manner that they reflect the new era we have entered into, so that they can be more effective in addressing conflict driven humanitarian crises as they occur, and not after they’ve occurred.

Undoubtedly, there will always be skilful actors who attempt to sway decisions one way or another in order to maintain or boost their influence on the global stage, but for the global community to be held hostage in this manner, while another global humanitarian disaster continues un-attended is disgraceful and unacceptable. Whatever ‘success’ stories are spun out as a result of the most recent turn of events in the Syrian war (i.e. giving up its chemical weapons; a big success for both the USA and Russia), the real losers are the Syrian people, and ultimately it is the failure to protect innocent people on both sides of the conflict from further suffering is what the UN and the UNSC will be judged on.

       

The Libya-Syria Intervention Question

It has become reflex to treat remark that foreign interventions in conflict do not work. It is extremely topical to refer to the current situation in Syria using Libya as a lens. The most common remark is that interventions do not work because ‘Libya is in a mess’. The logic is that Libya is in a mess because of the foreign intervention that denied the Gaddafi regime the opportunity to deploy its military in a full-scale attack on the citizens of Benghazi, who had come out onto the streets to express its wish for a change of regime, and the introduction of democracy.

Yes, Libya is in a mess. The state has fragmented, and its oil and gas sector has slumped, exporting only a tenth of what it normally exports. Militias have taken control of oil and gas facilities, and have taken control of local territories, and now openly contest the authority of the state. But is this a result of the foreign-led intervention in Libya, which denied the Gaddafi regime the ability to fight from the air, and provided support to the very same rebel groups who now control respective tribal and other territories?

In order to answer this question, several considerations must be made. Firstly, we have to address the question of what scenarios may have unfolded in Libya in the absence of intervention. Secondly, we have to address the question of whether the intervention itself is the cause of the fragmentation of the Libyan state. We have to address these questions together in order to establish the causality between intervention and state collapse in Libya with sufficient confidence. Failure to do so, is dishonest and misleading.

So let’s deal with the first question, that is; what scenarios may have unfolded in Libya in the absence of intervention. Let’s entertain the possibility that the Gaddafi regime was given the green light to go ahead and crush Benghazi, and route the “vermin” and “al-Qaeda” as Gaddafi repeatedly referred to the opposition. In the event of an all out military attack on Benghazi, only two outcomes can reasonably be envisaged. The first, and most likely, is that Libya would have then become the destination of choice for Jihadi groups from across the world, that the ‘rebels’ would have received piecemeal, basic support from other countries from within and without the region, and the country would have slumped progressively further towards civil war. Indeed, this is how the situation has unfolded in Syria. Hama and Homs were crushed by the Assad regime, and the country has devolved into a civil war within a short period of time. The outcome is 4 million internally displaced people and 2 million refugees who have fled across the borders, and a widespread humanitarian crisis has unfolded that now threatens to destabilize the entire region.

The second, and infinitely less likely outcome is that Benghazi would have been crushed and Libya would have returned to normal under the Gaddafi regime. In this scenario Gaddafi would have continued to strong-arm Libya’s various groups into an artificially cohesive feudal state, and prepared his son, Saif Al Islam, to take over from his rule. In this scenario, Libya continues to sail along as though it is entirely unaffected by the Arab Spring that continues to unfold across the region today. The second scenario is a far less likely outcome, and renders Libya a dictator state, that is; another accident waiting to happen in the region. In this scenario, Libya miraculously out-lives the horror of the crushing of Benghazi and sails off into the future as though it never happened. Hardly likely, actually; extremely unlikely. The stuff crack pipe dreams are made of.

The reasonable scenario, where Gaddafi would have ‘seen the light’ and stepped down and introduced real democratic elections was never on the cards. The proof of this is that he fought until the bitter end. So this, third option was never an option, and anyone who entertains this option has descended far beyond the aforementioned ‘pipe dream’ into the realms of childlike fantasy.

And to return to the original question; in the face of these two outcomes, can we reasonably argue that the fragmentation of the Libyan state is a result of the intervention? Well, nobody can argue with full confidence that they know how history would have unfolded, had particular events been different. That I acknowledge, but it still does not answer the question I originally posed. Is it really true that Libya is worse off because of the foreign intervention that essentially enabled it to break with the shackles of decades of authoritarian rule under a dictator?

In my view, Libya has not fragmented due to the foreign-led intervention. It has fragmented precisely because it has been artificially held together for decades under the violent and brutal rule of a dictator state. It is inevitable that no matter what political transition trajectory it adopted, that it would face a serious challenge in establishing real socio-political cohesion and introducing democratic reforms. It is my contention that wherever dictator-led or authoritarian regimes prevail for long periods of time over territories that are populated by diverse, heterogeneous groups, and rule through powerful centralized states that strong-arm the populace; that the collapse of these regimes inevitably leads the fragmentation of the state. This is simply because the state that people never trusted in the first place, and which held all the power, leaves a profound vacuum in its wake, and ordinary people would reasonably contest the remnants of it, even as it begins to reform. This is especially the case because entrenched interests work hard to hijack the process of democratic reforms to their own advantage. When people see the same state of old re-assembling itself they are quick to recognise the old wolf that now parades in new clothing. They then resist it, and hold onto the gains they have made. These gains are often territorial, especially if these territories have been gained through open, armed conflict in the streets.

That is, intervention or not, the fragmentation of dictator led and authoritarian regimes is inevitable when ‘revolution’ occurs, whether revolution is relatively peaceful (as in Egypt) or involves armed conflict (as in Libya and Syria). This fragmentation is more pronounced in countries such as Libya and Syria, because they are constituted of many, diverse tribal groups and clans. In Egypt, which is not as diverse, the general populace has split nonetheless; both sides (i.e. the anti-Muslim brotherhood and pro-Muslim brotherhood groups) profoundly distrust the state. This is precisely because the powerful centralised state is the main vehicle through which the revolution can be subverted or appropriated, resulting in more of the same ‘wolf’ in new clothing. And so, whether in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq, etc. the same dynamic unfolds when the state is fundamentally challenged by revolution. It (the state) attempts to remake itself amidst the revolution, and this is what all revolutions would do well to guard against, even if it means fragmenting in order to prevent the state from regaining its hold over the people.

The argument I am making here is that when we view these revolutions through another prism (i.e. what the legacy of large, centralised authoritarian or dictator-led states entail for revolution), it becomes patently clear that intervention or not, some fragmentation and commensurate resistance and open contestation with the state is to be expected. Blaming foreign-led interventions for the collapse of the state, ignores the fact that these states were fragile to begin with precisely because their governments and the state were not legitimate or representative in the first place. It ignores the fact that four decades of dictatorship or authoritarian rule would collapse like a ton of bricks no matter which direction the revolution takes.

The difficulty with transitioning to democracy, is precisely that it involves building the strong socio-political foundation that democracy requires. In my view, this is precisely the focus that is missing in the debates on the middle east and north Africa right now. That is, we are not discussing what democratic reforms can help bring about meaningful change and stability; where pluralism is guaranteed, and where the old ‘state’ is prevented from regenerating the very head that the people cut off. But like a lizard, the state can replicate and reproduce itself relatively easily. Indeed, that is what states, like most institutions, do. An institution is an institution precisely because if an individual is removed, it can carry on regardless. It has many heads and many tentacles, which if cut off, can morph and replicate each other. The state survives revolutions, and this is precisely why revolutions are so difficult in the first place; when the people have removed the leadership it is only be beginning of the struggle against the state. Reform - or rather reformation - of the state is at stake, and contestation is inevitable as this process unfolds amidst the unwinding of the previous regime.

The reason why the explanation I have tendered for the fragmentation in Libya is significantly more honest, is that it can be applied across the board in the Arab Spring. By focussing on what kind of state people were rebelling against, and why, it becomes easier to understand why there is such intense distrust of the state, and especially new governments. People who have been subject to the blatant lies and manipulation of an unjust system are quick to recognise when the same factors they fought to remove begin to re-emerge. It does not make sense to lay all the blame for the ‘crisis’ in Libya on the UN-sanctioned intervention. In all likelihood, Libya would have descended into a full scale civil war that resembles Syria without the intervention.

So when it comes to interventions, the question is not whether it will ultimately lead to a complete, binding ‘solution’ to the crisis. Rather, the question that interventions are concerned with is simple; is the intervention going to save lives and prevent the further loss of human life by disabling the capability of a rogue government or state to act illegally and/or brutally. Expecting a foreign led military intervention to automatically lead to full democratic reform, without any bumps in the road, or challenges to the process of transition, is ridiculously naive.

I will use an admittedly crude example by way of analogy, to explain my orientation on the issue of intervention. It is often said that one should not intervene in a domestic dispute, as the risks of both of them turning on you are high. When I was a teenager, one of the men in my apartment block took his wife and children hostage in the apartment, and it was clear that he had lost his ability to reason and may harm them. At the time in South Africa, family killings were occurring at a high rate. A neighbour and devoted father of two little sons – a mild man who I often watched playing soccer with his two boys in the park – convinced the troubled neighbour to open the door claiming that he ‘just wanted to speak with him’. When he opened the door, my brave neighbour pushed the door in and entered the apartment, and managed to get the children and their mother to safety. He put his life at risk to intervene in that situation, especially as the troubled neighbour was armed with a handgun. If the couple divorced after that event, it had nothing to do with the intervention that my brave, mild-mannered, dutiful father and neighbour made, at great risk to himself.

At another time, in the same apartment block, my father helped wrest away a knife from a son who had become enraged and wanted to attack his own father with it. I have also acted in a similar fashion when the need arose. Amongst my friends, the weakest among us would nonetheless stand up for and defend his friends when attacked, even when outnumbered. It was what provided the social bond between us, that is; the ability to take risks to protect one another. This is a very human orientation, which I believe is shared by communities across the world, although admittedly to greater or lesser degrees. But if we are to form and belong to a global community that has norms and standards to which we all subscribe, then we need to be able to take risks for each other when it counts.

The principle for intervention was very simple in the social and political context that I was raised; if someone is being oppressed, is subject to intolerable injustice, and you have the power to help them, then you should make an effort to help them. In the South African struggle the most often heard slogan was, “an injury to one is an injury to all”. Even the Jihadis who migrate half-way across the world also respond to this logic, that is, in the belief that in Islam it is your duty to help people who are being oppressed. Across the world, when human cruelty rises its ugly head and escalates to dangerous proportions, the victims ask, “where was the world when we were being killed”. It’s that simple! If there is no world out there that can intervene to help people in need, then there is no human project, and there is no humanitarianism between us.

Talk, without action, is empty. Sometimes an intervention requires political action, at other times actions to provide aid and humanitarian relief, and in the worst of situations, to intervene militarily in an escalating conflict or gross human rights abuses. Indeed, the United Nations is based upon these principles, and should take the lead in producing global consensus on how to address human disasters, whether they are due to social, economic, political and environmental changes, or whether they result from conflict or result in conflict. But what if the UN cannot provide an adequate response to a humanitarian disaster because it is crippled by political wrangling, total absence, or alternatively - if not equally - by bureaucratic ineptitude?

In a free society, I, as a citizen have the right to act to stop a crime if the law isn’t present, or is incapable of acting. If a policeman is incapacitated I am still legally entitled to effect a citizen’s arrest if I observe and judge that a criminal act is unfolding before me. This, at the same time, binds me to the responsibility, that after acting, I should make myself available to be judged by my actions in terms of the law. As long as I act reasonably, and in the interests of the social contract, I should be confident that I will be judged fairly. That is, even if I am not acting in self-defence, the law should always make provision for acting in the interests of greater society. Why should it be different for global citizens?

When it comes to Libya, the broadly proffered notion that Libya is in crisis because of the intervention it underwent is spurious and misleading. It negates all attempts at establishing adequate causality, and chooses instead to ignore Libya’s historical dispensation, and the consequences of any fundamental challenges that the Libyan state (and other authoritarian states) may endure. It is (and should be) obvious, that the authoritarian, often dictator-led states and governments of the Middle East and North Africa have endured the challenges to their rule by responding with increased levels of instability and fragmentation. This is what fundamental change and revolution brings; periods of enhanced turbulence where periodic internal conflicts, state confrontations and disruptions of all manners - both positive and negative - flare up from their respective potentials in the aftermath of revolution.

Democratic reform is not just about holding elections, writing constitutions, and changing legal systems; it is fundamentally about changing the state - that is; it’s functions, processes, regulations and authorities, and thereby its institutions - so that a new society can be produced. Producing a new society, especially in a society where socio-political cohesion has been artificially enforced by state institutions and the rule of authoritarian and/or dictatorial regimes, is bound to prove a challenge beset by many and diverse setbacks. In any quest for a new society, struggle is inevitable. It cannot avoided.

Whatever help a society receives from outsiders in obtaining the freedoms it requires to negotiate its own transition to a new set of norms and practises is only just that, help. Ultimately, what transpires in such fraught socio-cultural, political and economic countries depends on how well they can organise, as a society, to face their challenges. If they are unable to do so, it is only a reflection of how devastated societies in these countries are as a result of the long terms under which they have endured unjust governments. Placing the blame for the failures of these nations to re-establish themselves adequately in a post-revolutionary environment at the feet of interventionists ignores the political history of these nations entirely, and seeks to establish the moment of intervention as the beginning of the causal chain of events that lead to the failure of the state. This is a patent analytical falsehood. The reality is that these states had already failed to meet the demands and aspirations of their citizenry. They had already crumbled from within and were disasters waiting to happen. Intervention may be the last straw that breaks the camel’s back, but it is dishonest to ignore the oversized load that countries such as Libya and Syria were already carrying, which led to this mess in the first place.

Equating Libya with Iraq is even more ridiculous; these were entirely different situations. To start with, the intervention in Libya was supported by the UN. Interventions in sovereign states is a necessity in a globalized world. We cannot avoid the responsibility of acting to enforce global laws, else they become meaningless. When laws become meaningless, societies become corrupted, and all manner of abuses ensue. It makes the world more dangerous for all of us. It is this objective that interventions are concerned with, and not rescuing entire nations from the difficulties of political transitions that they must now negotiate because of their fraught histories. To campaign against any and all interventions on the basis that global hegemony is undesirable, or that only peaceful means will be effective, ignores everything that we know about genocide.

There will always be rulers and leaders who justify the use of unconscionable levels of force against their people. It does not always require chemical or nuclear weapons. In Rwanda, 500,000 machetes were enough to fuel genocide in which around 800,000 people lost their lives. The Syrian conflict reflects an abject failure of its own government. With 100,000 people dead, 4 million internally displaced and 2 million refugees across the border, and no end in sight to the conflict, it is clear that there will be no political solution that will emerge from within Syria. In all likelihood, without international involvement, Al Assad’s forces will crush both the opposition and all internal dissent that may emerge from within the country itself. The solution in Syria will not be political, it will be a military one, should Syria be left to its own devices. The anti-intervention stance, in this case, does not mean that any kind of peace will result. The implications of not intervening now is that the situation worsens, eventually drawing the entire region into its spectacular collapse. And as more information becomes available, and dribbles out of the Syrian state over the next few years, an intervention will likely become necessary in any event. As was the case in Kosovo, the world will avert its eyes just long enough for the brutality to result in another genocide, which after it is committed, cannot be undone. And then, all the wringing of hands in the world makes no difference to the families of the dead, should any of them remain. It will, and should, rest upon our consciences if we stood by and did nothing to prevent it, with all the evidence being clear that only more suffering can result from the path Syria is currently on.